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DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE ROLE OF
CLASSIFICATION AND MOTIVATION IN
EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AFTER
INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES
Samuel R. Bagenstos†
At least since the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Ricci
v. DeStefano, disparate-impact liability has faced a direct con-
stitutional threat.  This Article argues that the Court’s decision
last Term in Texas Department of Housing and Community
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., which held that
disparate-impact liability is available under the Fair Housing
Act, has resolved that threat, at least for the time being.
In particular, this Article argues, Inclusive Communities
is best read to adopt the understanding of equal protection
that Justice Kennedy previously articulated in his pivotal con-
currence in the 2007 Parents Involved case—which argued
that state actions that do not classify individuals based on
their race are not constitutionally suspect simply because they
are motivated by the purpose of integrating the races.  Apply-
ing that understanding, Inclusive Communities makes clear
that disparate impact need not surrender to equal protection,
but that the Constitution demands some limitations on dispa-
rate-impact liability.  Although the limitations should make a
difference at the margins, they are not nearly as severe as
some may have feared.
The broader goal of this Article is to offer an account of
how the principle that Justice Kennedy articulated in Parents
Involved, and that the Court seems to have adopted in Inclu-
sive Communities, fits into prior equal protection doctrine.
The Article argues that this interpretation of equal protection
represents the most attractive approach consistent with the
† Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.  I
presented an earlier version of this Article at the 2015 Colloquium on Scholarship
in Employment and Labor Law.  Thanks to the colloquium participants for helpful
feedback, and thanks, as always, to Margo Schlanger for many conversations
about this Article.  I should note that I filed a brief in the Inclusive Communities
case on behalf of a bipartisan group of former Department of Justice officials. See
Brief for John R. Dunne et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Tex.
Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507
(2015) (No. 13-1371), 2014 WL 7405726.  That brief articulated a number of the
constitutional arguments discussed in this Article.  All views expressed in this
article are mine alone.
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decided cases.  But although the Inclusive Communities ap-
proach to equal protection represents the best path available
to the Court in light of prior cases, it has substantial draw-
backs.  In addition to ignoring key normative considerations,
the Court’s formalistic focus on the existence or nonexistence
of a classification as a trigger for strict scrutiny is likely to
prove unstable.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 R
I. HAS THE COURT MADE PEACE BETWEEN DISPARATE
IMPACT AND EQUAL PROTECTION? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 R
A. The “War” Between Disparate Impact and
Equal Protection, Pre-Inclusive Communities . . 1120 R
B. Inclusive Communities and the Path to Peace . 1127 R
C. What Inclusive Communities Means for
Disparate Impact Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 R
1. On the Justifications for Disparate Impact
Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 R
a. Integration as a Principal Goal . . . . . . . . 1132 R
b. Intentional Discrimination as Including
Unconscious Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 R
c. Rejecting Justice Scalia’s Ricci
Suggestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 R
2. On the Implementation of Disparate Impact
Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 R
II. THE ROLE OF CLASSIFICATION AND MOTIVATION IN
EQUAL PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 R
A. Why the Effort to Achieve Racial Integration or
Close Racial Gaps Should Not Trigger Strict
Scrutiny Under the Court’s Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 R
B. Explaining Ricci, Adarand, and Davis . . . . . . . . 1150 R
C. Reasons for Using Classification as a Trigger
for Strict Scrutiny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 R
D. Concerns About the Court’s Analysis. . . . . . . . . 1162 R
CONCLUSION: LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 R
INTRODUCTION
At least since the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Ricci v.
DeStefano,1 antidiscrimination statutes providing for dispa-
rate-impact liability have faced a direct constitutional threat.
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Ricci made the threat
explicit.  “[T]he war between disparate impact and equal protec-
tion will be waged sooner or later,” he argued, so “it behooves
1 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
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us now to begin thinking about how—and on what terms—to
make peace between them.”2  When the Court granted certio-
rari to decide whether disparate-impact liability is available
under the Fair Housing Act in Texas Department of Housing
and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.3—
the third time in four Terms in which the Court had taken a
case presenting that question—the Court’s action hardly
seemed auspicious for supporters of disparate impact prohibi-
tions.  Yet the Court surprised most observers by ruling that
actions causing an unjustified disparate impact do violate the
FHA.4
I argue in this Article that Justice Kennedy’s opinion for
the Court does more than resolve a persistent statutory ques-
tion.  That opinion also promulgates terms for a peace settle-
ment between disparate impact and equal protection.  The
Inclusive Communities defendant, and several amici, argued
that disparate-impact liability at least raised serious constitu-
tional questions, and the plaintiff and its amici specifically con-
tested the point.  In his opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy
responded to these arguments by making clear that the dispa-
rate impact prohibition does not in and of itself violate the
Equal Protection Clause, but that some applications of that
prohibition might raise serious constitutional questions absent
the imposition of certain limitations on disparate impact cases.
Those conclusions reflect a particular understanding of
equal protection doctrine, one Justice Kennedy previously ar-
ticulated in his pivotal concurrence in Parents Involved in Com-
munity Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.5  In that case,
Justice Kennedy argued that state actions that do not classify
individuals based on their race are not constitutionally suspect
simply because they are motivated by the purpose of integrat-
ing the races.6  A fair reading of Inclusive Communities, I argue,
is that five justices have now endorsed that principle.  My first
goal in this Article is to establish that point.  I attempt to do
this in Part I.
In that Part, I also explore what the Court’s Inclusive Com-
munities ruling means for disparate impact law.  Although the
Court resolved the war between disparate impact and equal
2 Id. at 595–96 (Scalia, J., concurring).
3 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
4 See id. at 2525.
5 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
6 See id. at 788–90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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protection without forcing a surrender, its holding does impose
some limitations on disparate impact claims—and, depending
on the views of the justice who replaces Justice Scalia, these
limitations may well apply to the employment context as well as
to the fair housing context.  Although the limitations should
make a difference at the margins, they are not nearly as severe
as some civil rights advocates may have feared.
This Article has a broader goal, as well.  That is to offer an
account of how the principle that Justice Kennedy articulated
in Parents Involved, and that the Court seems to have adopted
in Inclusive Communities, fits into prior equal protection doc-
trine.  Although some scholars, notably Reva Siegel, have de-
fended Justice Kennedy’s Parents Involved opinion, they have
not tended to defend it in terms of its consistency with existing
doctrine,7 notably Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena8 and
Washington v. Davis.9
7 Professor Siegel’s Supreme Court Foreword, for example, takes a self-con-
sciously historical rather than doctrinal perspective. See Reva B. Siegel, The
Supreme Court, 2012 Term—Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1,
30–31 (2013) [hereinafter Siegel, Equality Divided].  Professor Siegel’s piece
describing the antibalkanization approach, in turn, is avowedly focused on elabo-
rating the “emergent independent view” of the “Justices in the middle of Supreme
Court conflicts over race equality,” notably Justice Kennedy, without attempting
to integrate that view systematically into the Court’s doctrine.  Reva B. Siegel,
From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race
Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1281 (2011) [hereinafter Siegel, An-
tibalkanization].  Professor Siegel’s recent Meador Lecture is an exception, see
Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious but Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality of Dispa-
rate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA. L. REV. 653 (2015) [hereinafter Siegel,
Race-Conscious], though even there she focuses primarily on understanding the
implications of recent Roberts Court cases such as Parents Involved, Ricci, and
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), as opposed to a
more systematic doctrinal argument.  Professor Robinson defends Justice Ken-
nedy’s analysis in doctrinal terms as well, though she does not intensively engage
with the question of how that analysis can be squared with Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976). See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral
Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secon-
dary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277, 277 (2009).  Andrew Carlon reaches conclu-
sions broadly similar to mine on the role of classification and motivation in the
Court’s jurisprudence in Andrew M. Carlon, Racial Adjudication, 2007 BYU L.
REV. 1151 (2007), though he does not engage, as I do, with the analytic instability
and second-best nature of the Court’s doctrine.  And of course his piece precedes
Ricci and Inclusive Communities.  A distinctive contribution of this Article is to
deepen the doctrinal analysis and explain why Justice Kennedy’s Parents Involved
principle fits as well with a fair understanding of equal protection doctrine as it
has developed over the past 40 years.  This Article also explains, to a degree other
commentators have not, what that principle means for statutory disparate impact
doctrine—particularly in light of the recent Inclusive Communities opinion.
8 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
9 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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Below, I attempt to demonstrate that Justice Kennedy’s
interpretation of equal protection is fully consistent with a
plausible reading of the prior cases, including Adarand and
Davis.  The Court has never held that all government actions
motivated by an effort to achieve racially defined ends trigger
strict scrutiny.  Rather, the Court has held that all racial classi-
fications trigger strict scrutiny, but it has left the crucial term,
classification, ambiguous.10  Though the Court has held that a
racially discriminatory purpose can transform a facially neu-
tral policy into the equivalent of a classification, it has never
held that the purposes of integrating the races or closing racial
gaps constitute discriminatory purposes.  And with good rea-
son.  A holding that the effort to close racial gaps triggers strict
scrutiny, even of laws that do not individually classify anyone
based on his or her race, would lead to results that virtually
nobody defends.  I elaborate on Justice Kennedy’s apparent
interpretation of what constitutes a classification, and argue
that it reflects a reasonable understanding of prior doctrine, in
Part II.
Although I believe that the Inclusive Communities approach
to equal protection represents the best path available to the
Court in light of prior cases, it has substantial drawbacks.  In
addition to ignoring key normative considerations, the Court’s
formalistic focus on the existence or nonexistence of a classifi-
cation as a trigger for strict scrutiny is likely to prove unstable.
In the Conclusion, I offer some speculation about possible fu-
ture paths that the doctrine might travel.
I
HAS THE COURT MADE PEACE BETWEEN DISPARATE
IMPACT AND EQUAL PROTECTION?
This Part, in Section I.A., describes the origins of the “war”
between equal protection and disparate impact, as well as the
state of play as of the time the Court granted certiorari in
Inclusive Communities.  It then turns to how Inclusive Commu-
nities addressed the issue.  I argue that the Court’s opinion
contains terms for a peace between equal protection and dispa-
rate impact, one in which neither side must surrender, but in
which disparate impact is nonetheless forced to give up some
ground.  These terms are rooted, I argue in Part I.B., in the
approach to equal protection articulated by Justice Kennedy in
10 See Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 7, at 48–49 (noting that the Court R
has “never once defined” the term).
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his Parents Involved concurrence.  In Part I.C., I attempt to
describe in detail what the peace terms mean for disparate
impact doctrine.
A. The “War” Between Disparate Impact and Equal
Protection, Pre-Inclusive Communities
Since the Supreme Court first interpreted Title VII in the
1971 Griggs case to impose liability without discriminatory in-
tent11—and especially since the 1980s—disparate impact has
been a political target.12  At least since the Court’s 1995
Adarand decision,13 disparate impact has been a constitu-
tional target as well. Adarand held that strict equal protection
scrutiny applies to federal laws that discriminate based on
race, even where those laws have “benign” motives.14  That
holding appeared to make disparate impact constitutionally
vulnerable in two respects.
First, laws providing for a disparate impact theory of liabil-
ity might be understood as being themselves discriminatory.
On one reading of the theory—a reading that finds support in
Griggs itself15—the whole point of disparate impact is to ensure
that minorities are not disproportionately shut out of jobs, at
least not without a good reason.16  Combining Washington v.
Davis17—which seems to treat facially neutral laws with a dis-
criminatory intent as the equivalent of racial classifications18—
with Adarand—which specifically rejects the argument that a
11 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 424 (1971).
12 See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION,
AND THE LAW 172-73 (2013) (describing Reagan-era attacks on disparate impact);
Siegel, Race-Conscious, supra note 7, at 663 (“[B]y the 1980s, critics of disparate R
impact in and allied with the Reagan administration increasingly attacked the
framework, arguing that it did not protect equality of opportunity but instead
protected ‘equality of results.’” (quoting Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair
Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312, 1312–1313 (1986))); Siegel,
Equality Divided, supra note 7, at 26 (describing political attacks by the Reagan R
Administration).
13 Adarand, 515 U.S. 200.
14 See id. at 225–27.
15 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (targeting “barriers that have operated in the
past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees”)
(emphasis added); id. at 432 (targeting “employment procedures or testing mecha-
nisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to
measuring job capability”) (emphasis added).
16 See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round
Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 523–25 (2003); Charles A. Sullivan, The World
Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV.
1505, 1506–07 (2004).
17 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
18 See id. at 243–48.
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good motive can avoid strict scrutiny19—one might argue that
laws providing liability for disparate impact themselves reflect
intentional discrimination.20
Second, the disparate impact theory might be unconstitu-
tional because of what it encourages employers and other regu-
lated entities to do.  Opponents of disparate-impact liability
have long expressed a worry that such liability will lead em-
ployers to hire “by the numbers.”21  Except in rare cases, gov-
ernment-imposed quota systems are unconstitutional.22  To
the extent that disparate impact encourages employers to en-
gage in such behavior, that theory of liability itself would raise
significant constitutional questions.23
The Supreme Court itself seemed to endorse at least the
second point in two cases narrowing Griggs in the 1980s.  In
the 1988 decision of Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,24
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion endorsed the proposition
“that the inevitable focus on statistics in disparate impact
cases could put undue pressure on employers to adopt inap-
propriate prophylactic measures.”25  Justice O’Connor en-
dorsed the imposition of “high standards of proof in disparate
impact cases” in order “to avoid giving employers incentives to
modify any normal and legitimate practices by introducing
19 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995).
20 Carlon presents the argument in the form of a syllogism:
Major premise: No distinction is made between “benign” or malign
motives for racial classification—in both cases, such classifications
are considered discriminatory, and subject to equally strict
scrutiny.
Minor premise: Facially neutral actions motivated by racially dis-
criminatory motives are to be treated as racial classifications.
Conclusion: Facially neutral actions that have benign racial pur-
poses will also be treated as racial classifications and subject to
strict scrutiny.
Carlon, supra note 7, at 1155.  I discuss this syllogistic argument extensively in R
infra Part II.B.
21 E.g., Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A “Quota Bill,” A
Codification of Griggs, A Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 287, 306 (1993).
22 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (“To be narrowly
tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system.”).  The
exception involves cases like United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185 (1987),
where such quotas are adopted as a temporary remedy for pervasive and long-
standing identified discrimination and repeated noncompliance with orders to
redress it.
23 See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973) (finding it “axiomatic
that a state may not induce, encourage or promote private persons to accomplish
what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish”) (quoting Lee v. Macon Cty.
Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 475–76 (M.D. Ala. 1967)).
24 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
25 Id. at 992 (plurality opinion).
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quotas or preferential treatment.”26  The next year, in Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,27 the Court held that plaintiffs in
disparate impact cases could not simply identify a statistical
disparity between different racial groups at the defendant’s
workforce; to succeed, the Court held, the plaintiffs must point
to some employer policy that caused the disparity and that
lacked a sufficient business justification.28  The Court based its
holding on the concern that, absent stringent standards for
bringing a disparate impact claim, “[t]he only practicable option
for many employers would be to adopt racial quotas, insuring
that no portion of their work forces deviated in racial composi-
tion from the other portions thereof . . . .”29
Congress overturned Wards Cove in the Civil Rights Act of
1991—though the precise effect of those changes has remained
unclear.30  In the period leading up to the statute’s passage,
many opponents—including President George H.W. Bush, who
vetoed an earlier version of the statute—criticized the bill as
promoting hiring quotas.31  Although President Bush aban-
doned that characterization after Congress softened the provi-
sions relating to Wards Cove, many other opponents did not.
Emblematically, a Wall Street Journal editorial that appeared
the day after President Bush signed the law was headlined,
simply, “It’s a Quota Bill.”32
Between Congress’s decision in 1991 to eliminate some of
the constraints on which the Court had relied to ensure that
disparate impact did not cause constitutional problems,33 and
the Court’s decision in 1995 to apply strict constitutional scru-
tiny to discriminatory federal laws34—even those with a benign
motivation—the constitutional risk to the disparate impact
26 Id. at 999.
27 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
28 See id. at 656.
29 Id. at 652.
30 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of An-
tidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 45 (2006) (arguing that “the vagueness of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 gives courts ample opportunity to translate their
hostility toward disparate impact into restrictive doctrine”).
31 For a discussion of President Bush’s approach to the Civil Rights Act of
1991, see generally Neal Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush, 68
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 983–99 (1993) (describing the political maneuvering
between the Bush White House, Congress, and other interested groups over the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
32 It’s a Quota Bill, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1991, at A12.
33 See, e.g., H.R. Rep No. 102-40 (II), at 1 (1991) (describing one of the pri-
mary purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as being “to respond to recent
Supreme Court decisions by restoring the civil rights protections that were dra-
matically limited by those decisions”).
34 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 225–27 (1995).
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doctrine should have been apparent.  In the early 2000s, a few
scholars—notably Professors Richard Primus and Charlie Sul-
livan—wrote about that risk.35  At around the same time, the
Court continued to make clear its distaste for disparate-impact
liability.  In Alexander v. Sandoval,36 for example, the Court
held that private plaintiffs could not enforce regulations,
adopted under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibited federal funding recipients from engaging in conduct
with an unjustified disparate impact.37  The Court’s opinion
emphasized the distance between the demands of disparate
impact and Title VI’s—and the Constitution’s—nondiscrimina-
tion requirement.38
Constitutional challenges to the disparate impact theory
did not emerge immediately.  But the 2009 decision in Ricci v.
DeStefano39 seemed to indicate that members of the Supreme
Court had very serious concerns about whether that theory
could be reconciled with the principles of Adarand. Ricci in-
volved pen-and-paper tests administered to candidates for pro-
motion in the New Haven, Connecticut, fire department.40
After the city administered the tests, it discovered that all ten of
the candidates with high enough scores to be eligible to promo-
tion to its then-vacant lieutenant positions were white, even
though forty-four percent of the candidates who took the lieu-
tenant’s examination were black or Latino.41  And of the nine
candidates with high enough scores to be eligible to promotion
to then-vacant captain positions, seven were white and two
were Latino, even though 19.5 percent of the candidates who
took the captain’s examination were black.42
Believing that use of the tests would violate Title VII’s pro-
hibition on employing selection criteria with an unjustified dis-
parate impact, the city decided not to certify the results of the
examination.43  Eighteen of the firefighters who would have
been eligible for promotion under the test sued; they claimed
35 Professor Primus devoted a leading article to assessing the constitutional
vulnerability of disparate impact following Adarand. See Primus, supra note 16. R
In a more limited vein, Professor Sullivan argued that, after Adarand, “limiting
disparate impact to minorities and women cannot survive equal protection analy-
sis.” Sullivan, supra note 16, at 1512. R
36 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
37 See id. at 293.
38 See id. at 280–86.
39 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
40 See id. at 562.
41 See id. at 566.
42 See id.
43 See id. at 572–74.
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that the refusal to certify the test violated their own rights
under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.44  The
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, agreed that
the city’s action violated Title VII, so it did not reach the consti-
tutional question.45
Although the Court limited its analysis to the statutory
issues, its opinion appeared to lend support to the notion that
laws imposing disparate-impact liability might themselves vio-
late the Constitution.  Most notably, the Court ruled that the
refusal to certify the examination results constituted inten-
tional discrimination—even though the city did not choose to
promote one candidate over another because of his race and
indeed even though the city’s decision did not in fact determine
that any particular candidate would or would not get a promo-
tion.46  It was enough that “the City chose not to certify the
examination results because of the statistical disparity based
on race—i.e., how minority candidates had performed when
compared to white candidates.”47  “Without some other justifi-
cation,” the Court held, “this express, race-based decisionmak-
ing violates Title VII’s command that employers cannot take
adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race.”48
The Court also found it irrelevant—at least for purposes of
determining whether the city intentionally discriminated—that
the city’s motivation was to avoid the threat of disparate-im-
pact liability rather than to harm whites.  The Court explained:
“Whatever the City’s ultimate aim—however well intentioned or
benevolent it might have seemed—the City made its employ-
ment decision because of race.”49
It is easy enough to see how these holdings, though
phrased in statutory terms, could threaten the constitutional-
ity of disparate-impact law.  If a decision to avoid one selection
criterion for a particular job, even where motivated by the de-
sire to avoid a disparate impact, is a “decision because of
race,”50 it would seem to constitute intentional discrimination
under the Constitution just as much as it does under Title
44 See id. at 574–75.
45 See id. at 576–77.
46 See Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening
Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 106–07 (2010) (“In fact,
the City’s actions were both racially attentive and race neutral; the tests were
cancelled for everyone, not for any particular racial group.  Everyone would have
to prepare and take the tests again.”) (footnote omitted).
47 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 579.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 579–80.
50 Id.
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VII.51  And though the Ricci Court said that an employer could
avoid Title VII liability for such a decision if it had a “strong
basis in evidence” for believing that the rejected selection crite-
rion would violate Title VII’s disparate impact doctrine,52 the
Court’s statement would offer cold comfort in a constitutional
case.  The Court explained that it was allowing a “strong basis”
defense under Title VII to avoid a “conflict” between the two
forms of liability expressly authorized by Congress.53  But the
Constitution trumps Title VII, and the Court expressly refused
to “hold that meeting the strong-basis-in-evidence standard
would satisfy the Equal Protection Clause in a future case.”54
To the extent that Title VII’s disparate impact principle requires
employers to engage in intentional discrimination of the sort
the Court found in Ricci, it would be perfectly easy to read that
case as supporting the conclusion that disparate-impact liabil-
ity was unconstitutional.55
If the Court’s opinion in Ricci left any doubt about the
matter, Justice Scalia filed a concurrence that specifically flag-
ged the constitutional question.  The Court’s decision, he said,
“merely postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to
confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the dis-
parate-impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
51 See Michelle Adams, Is Integration a Discriminatory Purpose?, 96 IOWA L.
REV. 837, 877 (2011) (“Under Ricci’s logic, the government does not act neutrally
when it takes action to integrate the workplace or other setting to avoid a racially
disparate impact.”); Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards
a Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 229 (2010)
(“The Court now, however, appears to treat a decision maker’s attention to the
disparities experienced by members of traditionally subordinated racial groups—
that is, its antisubordination ends—as inextricable from an intent to discriminate
against others, and thus sufficiently suspicious to demand justification.”); Rich-
ard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1344 (2010)
(“For these purposes, Title VII’s prohibition of disparate treatment and the Four-
teenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection are substantively
interchangeable.”).
52 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 582–84.
53 Id. at 583.
54 Id. at 584.
55 See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact, 34 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2157, 2163 (2013) (“Ricci means that disparate-impact liability is vulnerable
to constitutional attack.  After all, Ricci characterizes a decision to abandon a
promotional practice because of the race of successful candidates as a form of
racial discrimination, meaning that disparate-impact liability, triggered as it is by
the race of successful candidates, is a type of racial classification subject to strict
scrutiny, which Gerald Gunther once famously labeled ‘“strict” in theory and fatal
in fact.’”); see also Ian Haney-Lo´pez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1779, 1873 (2012) (“In effect, the conservative Justices ruled five-to-four that
considering racial impact in order to avoid potential discrimination itself consti-
tuted racial discrimination. That bears repeating, though the logic induces ver-
tigo: to consider race, even in order to avoid discrimination, is discrimination.”).
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1964 consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal pro-
tection?”56  He went on to explain why the Court’s analysis
suggested that disparate impact is in fact unconstitutional:
Whether or not Title VII’s disparate-treatment provisions for-
bid “remedial” race-based actions when a disparate-impact
violation would not otherwise result—the question resolved
by the Court today—it is clear that Title VII not only permits
but affirmatively requires such actions when a disparate-im-
pact violation would otherwise result.  But if the Federal Gov-
ernment is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of
race, then surely it is also prohibited from enacting laws
mandating that third parties—e.g., employers, whether pri-
vate, state, or municipal—discriminate on the basis of race.
As the facts of these cases illustrate, Title VII’s disparate-
impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, often
requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their
policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those
racial outcomes.  That type of racial decisionmaking is, as the
Court explains, discriminatory.57
He concluded that “the war between disparate impact and
equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves
us to begin thinking about how—and on what terms—to make
peace between them.”58
To be sure, Ricci did not require a holding that disparate
impact laws are unconstitutional.59  It may have been signifi-
cant that the city refused to certify the test after learning the
races of those who took it and would have been promoted
under it.  The case thus looked more like a case of intentional
discrimination against an identifiable set of victims than would
an employer’s decision, in first designing the test, to seek to
avoid any unjustified disparate racial impacts.60  At least some
language in the Court’s opinion supports that reading, though
it too is ambiguous.61  Notwithstanding any comfort a reader
56 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57 Id. (citations omitted).
58 Id. at 595–96.
59 See Siegel, Antibalkanization, supra note 7, at 1316 (“On an initial reading, R
Justice Kennedy’s opinion is ambiguous, unclear in its implications for disparate
impact law and for equal protection.”).
60 See Primus, supra note 51, at 1369–75. R
61 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585 (“Title VII does not prohibit an employer from
considering, before administering a test or practice, how to design that test or
practice in order to provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of
their race.”).  The language is ambiguous, because “fair opportunity for all individ-
uals” may or may not include efforts to avoid unjustified disparate impacts.  On
the importance, and ambiguity, of this language, see Adams, supra note 51, at R
861–63.
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might have taken from that language, the Ricci opinion as a
whole seemed to threaten the constitutionality of disparate im-
pact law.  And that is where the law stood when the Court took
up Inclusive Communities.
B. Inclusive Communities and the Path to Peace
Unlike Ricci, Inclusive Communities did not involve employ-
ment discrimination and Title VII.  It involved housing discrimi-
nation and the Fair Housing Act.  In an echo of Ricci (at least as
it was decided), the question formally before the Court was a
statutory, not a constitutional one.  The Court granted certio-
rari to decide “whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable
under the Fair Housing Act.”62  Endorsing the holdings of every
court of appeals to have decided the question, the Court an-
swered that question in the affirmative.63
Although the question presented was a statutory one, the
Court’s opinion demonstrates a deep engagement with the con-
stitutional questions that Ricci teed up.  The defendants argued
that interpreting the Fair Housing Act to incorporate disparate-
impact liability would “raise[ ] serious constitutional ques-
tions.”64  Several of the defendants’ amici similarly argued that
a disparate impact prohibition was unconstitutional.65  De-
fendants and their amici relied on Ricci, among other cases, to
support their arguments.66  And the plaintiff and its amici spe-
cifically responded that laws imposing disparate-impact liabil-
ity in housing were consistent with the Court’s precedents
interpreting the Constitution.67  Because the Fair Housing Act
62 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2513 (2015).
63 Id. at 2525.
64 Brief for the Petitioners at 42–46, Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. 2507
(No. 13-1371), 2014 WL 6466935, at *42–46.
65 See Brief Amici Curiae of Gail Heriot and Peter Kirsanow in Support of
Petitioners at 29–36, Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. (No. 13-1371), 2014 WL
6660913, at *29–*36; Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, Inc. & Allied Educ.
Found. in Support of Petitioners at 5–12, Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. (No.
13-1371), 2014 WL 6706834, at *5–12; Brief Amicus Curiae of Pac. Legal Found.
et al. in Support of Petitioners at 20–26, Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. (No. 13-
1371), 2014 WL 6706836, at *20–26; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Project on Fair
Representation in Support of Petitioners, Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. (No.
13-1371), 2014 WL 6660915.
66 See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 64, at 43–45. R
67 See Brief for Respondent at 63, Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. (No. 13-
1371), 2014 WL 7242817, at *63; Brief for John R. Dunne et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 6–7, Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. (No. 13-1371),
2014 WL 7405726, at *6–7; Brief Of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc. in Support of Respondents at 24–32, Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct.
(No. 13-1371), 2014 WL 7477679, at *24–32, .
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does not expressly provide for disparate-impact liability, if a
majority of the Court had serious constitutional concerns
about disparate impact claims per se, the Court would likely
have avoided the constitutional problem by reading the statute
not to provide for such claims.68  By holding that the Fair
Housing Act does provide for disparate-impact liability, the
Court must therefore have rejected the argument that dispa-
rate impact law is unconstitutional.  More than that, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court specifically adverted to the
constitutional arguments the parties and their amici had
raised.  The opinion made clear that, in the Court’s view, dispa-
rate impact prohibitions do raise constitutional concerns—but,
crucially, that those concerns involve the application and not
the existence of disparate impact law.69
The Court explained that merely considering race in an
effort “to foster diversity and combat racial isolation” was
proper:
Just as this Court has not “question[ed] an employer’s affirm-
ative efforts to ensure that all groups have a fair opportunity
to apply for promotions and to participate in the [promotion]
process,” Ricci, 557 U. S., at 585, it likewise does not impugn
housing authorities’ race-neutral efforts to encourage revital-
ization of communities that have long suffered the harsh con-
sequences of segregated housing patterns. When setting their
larger goals, local housing authorities may choose to foster
diversity and combat racial isolation with race-neutral tools,
and mere awareness of race in attempting to solve the
problems facing inner cities does not doom that endeavor at
the outset.70
On this analysis, laws imposing liability for unjustified dispa-
rate impact are not themselves unconstitutionally discrimina-
tory, even though they aim to achieve a racially defined result
(racial integration).  The Court explained that “[i]n striving to
achieve our ‘historic commitment to creating an integrated so-
ciety,’ we must remain wary of policies that reduce homeown-
ers to nothing more than their race,”71 but that disparate
impact under the Fair Housing Act plays “an important part in
68 See Richard Primus, Of Visible Race-Consciousness and Institutional Role:
Equal Protection and Disparate Impact after Ricci and Inclusive Communities, in
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AFTER 50 YEARS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY 67TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 295, 298 (2015).
69 Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2521–24.
70 Id. at 2525.
71 Id. (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)).
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avoiding the Kerner Commission’s grim prophecy that ‘[o]ur
Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—
separate and unequal’”—and perforce in “moving the Nation
toward a more integrated society.”72
Although the Court found no constitutional problem in the
existence of disparate impact prohibitions, it did conclude that
those prohibitions might raise such problems in their applica-
tion.  In particular, the Court determined that “serious consti-
tutional questions” would arise if the disparate impact doctrine
were applied “[w]ithout adequate safeguards” to ensure that it
did not “cause race to be used and considered in a pervasive
way” that “ ‘would almost inexorably lead’ governmental or pri-
vate entities to use ‘numerical quotas.’”73  In so holding, the
Court appeared to constitutionalize some of the limitations on
the disparate impact doctrine that it had previously adopted
under Title VII—limitations that Congress overturned, at least
in part, in 1991.74  As I explain in the next section, this aspect
of the Court’s opinion has implications for the application of
disparate impact law in and out of the fair housing context.
Depending on the composition of the post-Scalia Court, this
aspect of Inclusive Communities could put some aspects of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 at constitutional risk.  But the opinion
makes clear that any frontal constitutional assault on dispa-
rate-impact liability should fail.
A fair reading of Inclusive Communities, then, would under-
stand the Court’s opinion as taking up Justice Scalia’s invita-
tion to “make peace” between “disparate impact and equal
protection.”75  In the Court’s peace settlement, the disparate
impact doctrine was required to give up some territory, but it
was not called upon to surrender.  That settlement closely fol-
lows the constitutional analysis Justice Kennedy—the author
of the Court’s Inclusive Communities opinion—articulated in
his pivotal concurrence in Parents Involved.  In that concur-
rence, Justice Kennedy argued that “individual classifica-
tions”—laws and practices that assign racial categories to
individuals and treat them differently as a result—are what
trigger strict constitutional scrutiny.76  But, he concluded,
72 Id. at 2525–26 (quoting NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968)).
73 Id. at 2523 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653
(1989)).
74 See Browne, supra note 21, at 304–11. R
75 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595–96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
76 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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merely “race-conscious measures”77 that are neutral in their
operation but aim to promote integration and overcome “racial
isolation”78 do not raise the same constitutional concerns.79
In his Parents Involved concurrence, Justice Kennedy said
that the political branches “may pursue the goal of bringing
together students of diverse backgrounds and races through
other means [than individual classifications], including strate-
gic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones
with general recognition of the demographics of neighbor-
hoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting
students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enroll-
ments, performance, and other statistics by race.”80  Because
“[t]hese mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to dif-
ferent treatment based on a classification that tells each stu-
dent he or she is to be defined by race,” he declared, “it
is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny.”81  As
Michelle Adams put it, “[f]or Justice Kennedy, the government
may seek to achieve integration but may not pursue the inte-
gration objective using racial classifications.”82  And that, I ar-
gue, is the view that five justices adopted in Inclusive
Communities.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Inclusive Com-
munities explicitly invokes his pivotal Parents Involved concur-
rence.83 Inclusive Communities is fairly read to rely on the
constitutional analysis in that concurrence.  Because prohibi-
tions on disparate impact do not individually classify people
based on their race, in this view, the prohibitions are not them-
selves constitutionally suspect simply because they seek to
achieve the “race-conscious” goals of promoting integration
and closing racial gaps.84  To the extent that they operate to
encourage regulated entities to classify individuals based on
race, though, disparate impact prohibitions raise “serious con-
stitutional questions” and must be appropriately cabined.85
77 Id.
78 Id. at 788.
79 See id. at 789.
80 Id.
81 Id.  Professor Rosenthal is therefore just wrong to suggest that Justice
Kennedy “advocat[es] the use of strict scrutiny for any race-conscious governmen-
tal action.” Rosenthal, supra note 55, at 2202. R
82 Adams, supra note 51, at 854. R
83 See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015) (citation omitted).
84 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 796–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
85 Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
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C. What Inclusive Communities Means for Disparate
Impact Law
As I have shown, although the Inclusive Communities Court
did not believe that disparate-impact liability inherently vio-
lates the Constitution, it suggested that such liability might
well be unconstitutional in its application.  In particular, the
Court concluded that disparate impact would raise “serious
constitutional questions” if it was applied in such a way as to
encourage potential defendants to “adopt racial quotas” to
avoid liability.86  This concern fits well with Justice Kennedy’s
Parents Involved concurrence, which allows the achievement of
racial integration through race-neutral means but is highly
skeptical of practices that classify individuals based on their
race.87  As the Court put it in Inclusive Communities, quoting
that concurrence, “[i]n striving to achieve our ‘historic commit-
ment to creating an integrated society,’ we must remain wary of
policies that reduce homeowners to nothing more than their
race.”88
The Court’s understanding of what are—and what are
not—the serious constitutional questions posed by disparate-
impact liability had a number of implications for its elaboration
of what, precisely, disparate-impact liability demands. Inclu-
sive Communities involved the Fair Housing Act, so the Court’s
discussion was driven by that context.  But because the
Court’s ruling was based on its understanding of the constitu-
tional limitations on disparate impact, it has implications for
all of the race discrimination statutes that impose that form of
liability.  In particular, as I show in Part I.C.1. below, the
Court’s opinion makes clear that Justice Scalia was wrong to
think that disparate impact law could constitutionally be based
only on an effort to uncover covert discrimination.  But, as I
show in Part I.C.2. below, the Court’s opinion raises constitu-
tional concerns about some of the rules Congress adopted for
disparate impact in employment in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Unless the justice who replaces Justice Scalia joins with the
four justices who dissented in Parents Involved to embrace a
broader view of disparate impact, the Inclusive Communities
86 Id.
87 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 796–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
88 Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2525 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted) (quoting Parents Involved, 551
U.S. at 797).
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decision is likely to result in a reversion to some pre-1991 law
in this area.
1. On the Justifications for Disparate Impact Law
Since Griggs, scholars have disagreed about the goal of
disparate impact law.  Some have seen disparate impact’s func-
tion as merely evidentiary—as identifying circumstances in
which defendants are engaging in covert intentional discrimi-
nation.89  Others have seen the law’s function as more distribu-
tive—as aiming to overcome an unfair group-based distribution
of jobs or other resources.90  The distribution may be unfair, in
particular, because it reflects past societal discrimination.91
And still others have seen disparate impact’s function as pro-
tecting individuals against arbitrary barriers to opportunity.92
The Griggs decision offers support for all three of these possible
goals.93
a. Integration as a Principal Goal
The Inclusive Communities opinion makes clear that identi-
fying hidden intentional discrimination is one of the functions
of disparate impact law, but that it is not the only one.94  To the
contrary, the first function that the Court listed for disparate
impact law was to challenge practices that “unfairly . . . exclude
minorities from certain neighborhoods without any sufficient
89 See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective The-
ory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1303 (1987).
90 See Primus, supra note 16, at 523–24. R
91 See Siegel, Race-Conscious, supra note 7, at 658–59.  As Griggs put it, R
“Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”  Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
92 See JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
165–66 (2014) (demonstrating that disparate impact has been used to strike down
“artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary” barriers to employment); Samuel R.
Bagenstos, Bottlenecks and Antidiscrimination Theory, 93 TEX. L. REV. 415,
424–25 (2014) (arguing that the disparate impact doctrine has been used to
eliminate “unjustified bottleneck[s]” to opportunity).
93 On covert intentional discrimination, see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427–28 (not-
ing that the defendant had adopted the challenged selection criteria for positions
from which it had in the past excluded black applicants “on July 2, 1965, the date
on which Title VII became effective”).  On distribution, see id. at 429–30 (describ-
ing Title VII’s purpose to “remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor
an identifiable group of white employees over other employees”).  On protecting
individuals against arbitrary barriers to opportunity, see id. at 436 (“What Con-
gress has commanded is that any tests used must measure the person for the job
and not the person in the abstract.”).
94 See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2520–21 (2015).
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justification.”95  And the Court said that the disparate impact
prohibition “has allowed private developers to vindicate the
FHA’s objectives and to protect their property rights by stop-
ping municipalities from enforcing arbitrary and, in practice,
discriminatory ordinances barring the construction of certain
types of housing units.”96
Later in its opinion, the Court made clear just what it
meant when it referred to “the FHA’s objectives” of eliminating
“unfair” and “arbitrary” exclusions.  It meant that disparate
impact serves the function of eliminating practices that, with-
out sufficient justification, entrench the continuing effects of
past housing segregation.  In the closing paragraphs of its
opinion, the Court declared that the Fair Housing Act “must
play an important part in avoiding the Kerner Commission’s
grim prophecy that ‘[o]ur Nation is moving toward two societies,
one black, one white—separate and unequal.’”97  And the
Court “acknowledge[d] the Fair Housing Act’s continuing role in
moving the Nation toward a more integrated society.”98  Dispa-
rate impact claims, the Court made clear, promote “race-neu-
tral efforts to encourage revitalization of communities that have
long suffered the harsh consequences of segregated housing
patterns” and incentivize government decisions “to foster diver-
sity and combat racial isolation with race-neutral tools.”99
Nothing in the Court’s analysis suggests that this goal of dispa-
rate impact law is driven by a desire to respond only to the
defendant’s own past intentional discrimination.  Rather, the
goal is to combat “racial isolation” and “segregated housing
patterns”—results that exist in the world, independent of
whose actions caused them in the first place.100
95 Id. at 2522.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 2525 (quoting NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968)).
98 Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2525–26.
99 Id. at 2525.
100 As Justice Kennedy noted in his Parents Involved concurrence, the pattern
of segregation and racial isolation was caused by a mixture of government and
private actions. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701, 798 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“Due to a variety of factors—some influenced by government, some
not—neighborhoods in our communities do not reflect the diversity of our Nation
as a whole.”).  For extensive recent discussions of this interrelationship, see RICH-
ARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE MAKING OF FERGUSON: PUBLIC POLICIES AT THE
ROOT OF ITS TROUBLES (2014); Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC,
June 2014.  But although some of the factors influencing present-day racial isola-
tion may not result from government action, Justice Kennedy’s Parents Involved
concurrence noted that the government retains a “moral and ethical obligation to
fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated society.” Parents Involved,
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b. Intentional Discrimination as Including Unconscious
Bias
Just as important, the Inclusive Communities Court made
clear that that intentional discrimination includes, for legal
purposes, not just animus-based actions but also those that
are driven by unconscious biases.  The Court explained that
“[r]ecognition of disparate-impact liability under the FHA also
plays a role in uncovering discriminatory intent.”101  In
describing the sorts of “intent” that the disparate impact doc-
trine “uncover[s],” the Court referred not just to “disguised ani-
mus” but also to “unconscious prejudices.”102
That is an exceptionally important statement, because the
Court had never before explicitly held that actions driven by
unconscious bias constitute intentional discrimination.  To be
sure, that conclusion was implicit in the Court’s longstanding
test for discriminatory intent—that an action was taken “at
least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group.”103  The Court has explained
that a plaintiff need not “prove that the challenged action
rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes.”104  If I treat
someone worse that I treat someone else, and I do so at least in
part because I harbor a bias (unknown to me) against members
of the disfavored person’s race, that person’s race has caused a
difference in treatment, which should count as intentional dis-
crimination under the Court’s cases.  The fact that I may have
harbored no conscious animus should be of no moment.105
Still, many commentators have previously failed to appreciate
that discrimination actuated by unconscious bias counts as
551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
In his opinion for the Court in Inclusive Communities, Justice Kennedy quoted
that very “historic commitment” passage in describing the work of the Fair Hous-
ing Act. See Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2525.
101 Id. at 2522.
102 Id.
103 Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
104 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977) (emphasis added).
105 Judge Kozinski gave the following analogous example:
Assume you are an anglo homeowner who lives in an all-white
neighborhood.  Suppose, also, that you harbor no ill feelings toward
minorities.  Suppose further, however, that some of your neighbors
persuade you that having an integrated neighborhood would lower
property values and that you stand to lose a lot of money on your
home.  On the basis of that belief, you join a pact not to sell your
house to minorities.  Have you engaged in intentional racial and
ethnic discrimination?  Of course you have.
Garza v. Cty. of L.A., 918 F.2d 763, 778 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991).
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“intentional.”106  By stating clearly that it does, the Inclusive
Communities opinion represents an important step in the law.
c. Rejecting Justice Scalia’s Ricci Suggestion
The opinion also represents a response to Justice Scalia’s
suggestion in Ricci that racial disparate impact prohibitions are
unconstitutional because they are not tied to preventing inten-
tional discrimination.  In Justice Scalia’s apparent view, dispa-
rate impact could be valid only if it served the “evidentiary”
function of identifying “genuine, intentional discrimination—to
‘smoke out,’ as it were, disparate treatment.”107  But, he sug-
gested, even such an understanding would not save disparate
impact as it exists under Title VII: “[A]rguably the disparate-
impact provisions sweep too broadly to be fairly characterized
in such a fashion—since they fail to provide an affirmative
defense for good-faith (i.e., nonracially motivated) conduct, or
perhaps even for good faith plus hiring standards that are en-
tirely reasonable.”108
If, as Inclusive Communities says, actions triggered by un-
conscious bias count as intentional discrimination, a good-
faith defense is hardly necessary or appropriate.  The distinc-
tive aspect of unconscious bias is that the person who harbors
that bias does not perceive it.  Such a person can believe, in
complete good faith, that she is not biased; to let her off the
hook because she acts in good faith would be to eliminate
much prospect of responding to unconscious bias.  And of
course disparate impact doctrine already includes a defense for
actions driven by “business necessity” (in an employment case)
or, “analogous[ly],” if the actions are “necessary to achieve a
valid interest” (in a housing case).109  A more lenient defense,
which would allow actions that cause a significant disparate
impact if they were merely reasonable, does not seem appropri-
ate—and certainly is not necessary to tie the disparate impact
prohibition to the elimination of intentional, unconscious dis-
crimination.  When a person treats another adversely, and does
106 Even those who urge that the law should take account of unconscious bias
too often assume that unconscious bias falls outside of the legal concept of inten-
tional discrimination. See, e.g., Eva Paterson, Kimberly Thomas Rapp & Sara
Jackson, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection in the 21st Century: Building upon
Charles Lawrence’s Vision to Mount a Contemporary Challenge to the Intent Doc-
trine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1180–82 (2008) (arguing that the Court’s Intent
Doctrine does not reach unconscious bias).
107 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
108 Id.
109 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2522–23 (2015).
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so because of the other’s race, that is discrimination even if we
could tell a reasonable, non-race-based story for the difference
in treatment.
In any event, the constitutional principle underlying Inclu-
sive Communities renders Justice Scalia’s point largely moot.  If
a disparate impact prohibition does not itself constitute a racial
classification that triggers strict scrutiny, there is no reason
why, constitutionally, such a prohibition should be limited to
the evidentiary function of smoking out hidden intentional dis-
crimination.  Rather, the goals of eradicating the effects of seg-
regation, ending racial isolation, and closing racial gaps are
entirely permissible ones.  And the structure of disparate im-
pact law, which requires the plaintiff to show a practice that
causes a significant disparate impact, then gives the defendant
the opportunity to show that the practice was supported by
“business necessity” or the equivalent, is an entirely appropri-
ate way of achieving those goals.  I turn, in the next section, to
what Inclusive Communities has to say about how courts
should apply that structure.
2. On the Implementation of Disparate Impact Law
Although the Inclusive Communities Court evidently did not
believe that disparate impact prohibitions themselves consti-
tute racial classifications, the Court did believe that, unless
appropriately limited, those prohibitions risk encouraging po-
tential defendants to comply by adopting racial classifications
of their own.  Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court
said that “serious constitutional questions” would arise if dis-
parate impact prohibitions did lead to the adoption of racial
classifications.110  In order to avoid these questions, the Court
articulated a series of limitations on disparate-impact liabil-
ity.111  Strictly speaking, the Court’s discussion applies only to
the Fair Housing Act—which contains no provisions spelling
out precisely how courts should analyze disparate impact
cases.  But because that discussion was based on an under-
standing of background constitutional principles rather than of
the specific statutory structure, there is every reason to expect
that the justices expected the limitations the Court imposed on
110 Id. at 2522–24.
111 See id. at 2512 (“Courts should avoid interpreting disparate-impact liabil-
ity to be so expansive as to inject racial considerations into every housing
decision.”).
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disparate impact in Inclusive Communities also to apply to race-
based disparate impact cases in employment under Title VII.112
This is a matter of some significance.  Many of the constitu-
tional concerns articulated by Inclusive Communities echo con-
cerns expressed by the Rehnquist Court in its Title VII cases in
the 1980s.  Indeed, Inclusive Communities specifically points to
the most noted (many would say notorious) case of that period,
Wards Cove,113 to support its concerns.114  In order to avoid
the risk that Title VII disparate impact would encourage em-
ployers to adopt quota systems, Wards Cove adopted a number
of limitations on that theory of liability.115  After extensive de-
bate, a presidential veto, and further negotiations, Congress
overturned some of those limitations in the Civil Rights Act of
1991.116  Yet Inclusive Communities revives key aspects of the
Wards Cove reasoning.  And because the Court clothed that
reasoning in constitutional garb, its decision threatens to re-
vive aspects of the Wards Cove holding as well—even in the
Title VII context in which Congress sought to overturn it.  This
may not be a matter of great practical significance, as disparate
impact cases under Title VII have not been exceptionally suc-
cessful even after the Civil Rights Act of 1991.117  But it might
take some of the glisten off of the victory liberals won in Inclu-
sive Communities.118
112 Whether they will, in fact, apply to Title VII cases depends on two factors:
first, whether the appointee who replaces Justice Scalia takes a position to the left
of Justice Kennedy on this question; and, if so, whether that new appointee,
together with the four justices who dissented in Parents Involved, wishes to con-
fine this aspect of Inclusive Communities to Fair Housing Act cases and accord-
ingly defend the rules Congress wrote for disparate impact employment cases in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
113 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
114 See Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
115 See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 652–53, 657–58 (detailing how a party can
make out a prima facie case to demonstrate a disparate impact).
116 See supra text accompanying notes 27–32. R
117 See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 701, 735, 744–48 (2006).
118 One of the limitations the Court imposed—that remedies in disparate im-
pact cases should where possible concentrate on eliminating the practice that
causes the disparate impact and otherwise on “eliminat[ing] racial disparities
through race-neutral means,” Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2524—de-
serves little discussion.  Although this is an important remedial limitation, it is
one that courts have applied to disparate impact cases under Title VII for years.
See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of
Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1238 (2003) (“The standard
judicial remedy in a Title VII disparate impact case requires the employer to
change the policy or standard for everybody, not just the protected group.”).
Cases like Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421
(1986), which upheld racial affirmative action as a remedy for disparate impact
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The principal tool the Court employed in Inclusive Commu-
nities to ensure that disparate impact did not violate the Con-
stitution was to require plaintiffs to identify a particular
practice or set of practices imposed by the defendant that
caused the disparate impact.  The Court stated that “a dispa-
rate-impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity must fail
if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies
causing that disparity.”119  As the next two sentences of the
Court’s opinion make clear, that “causality” requirement comes
directly from Wards Cove:
A robust causality requirement ensures that “[r]acial imbal-
ance . . . does not, without more, establish a prima facie case
of disparate impact” and thus protects defendants from being
held liable for racial disparities they did not create. Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653, 109 S. Ct.
2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989), superseded by statute on
other grounds, 42 U.S.C. §2000e–2(k).  Without adequate
safeguards at the prima facie stage, disparate-impact liability
might cause race to be used and considered in a pervasive
way and “would almost inexorably lead” governmental or pri-
vate entities to use “numerical quotas,” and serious constitu-
tional questions then could arise. 490 U.S., at 653, 109 S. Ct.
2115.120
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress attempted, at
least in part, to overrule this aspect of Wards Cove.121  Codify-
ing disparate-impact liability under Title VII, the statute stated
that plaintiffs must presumptively identify “a particular em-
ployment practice that causes a disparate impact.”122  But only
presumptively: If the plaintiff “can demonstrate to the court
that the elements of a respondent’s decision-making process
are not capable of separation for analysis, the decision-making
process may be analyzed as one employment practice.”123
These carefully wrought provisions were the subject of a partic-
violations “where an employer or a labor union has engaged in persistent or
egregious discrimination,” id. at 445 (plurality opinion), are basically unicorns
today.
119 Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
120 Id.
121 To be sure, only in part.  One leading management lawyer described Con-
gress as having “appear[ed] to have accepted a substantial portion of the Wards
Cove and Watson formulation.”  Rosemary Alito, Disparate Impact Discrimination
Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1011, 1017 (1993).  That
lawyer is the sister of then-Judge, now Justice, Alito.
122 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
123 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
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ularly intensive negotiation and debate in Congress.124  If the
Inclusive Communities analysis applies to Title VII, all of that
effort may prove to have been for nothing.  It is now unclear
whether a plaintiff may ever succeed on a disparate impact
claim—even under Title VII—without identifying a particular
practice that caused the disparate impact.
To be sure, the practical significance of this change may
not be great.  Even before Inclusive Communities, courts were
wary about allowing Title VII disparate-impact plaintiffs to pro-
ceed without challenging some discrete policy or practice of the
employer.125  And by referring to a “policy or policies causing
th[e] disparity,”126 perhaps the Court’s holding leaves space for
plaintiffs to challenge a connected series of practices without
separating them out for analysis.  Still, the reliance on Wards
Cove is striking.
In addition to the “causality” requirement, the Inclusive
Communities Court offered a second “important and appropri-
ate means of ensuring that disparate-impact liability is prop-
erly limited”—that courts should give defendants “leeway to
state and explain the valid interest served by their policies.”127
Here again, the Court’s opinion echoes the decision in Wards
Cove—though without, this time, explicitly invoking that case.
One of the most significant issues that divided the Court in
Wards Cove was how strong an employer’s interest in a chal-
lenged practice must be to defeat disparate-impact liability.
The majority stated that “the dispositive issue is whether a
challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate
employment goals of the employer.”128  The dissenters argued
that the “legitimate employment goals” standard set the bar of
justification far too low; they believed that the proper test was
one of “business necessity.”129  The majority, in turn, re-
124 See Reginald C. Govan, Honorable Compromises and the Moral High
Ground: The Conflict Between the Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 127–28, 208–09, 229, 231 (1993); Peter M. Leibold et.
al., Civil Rights Act of 1991: Race to the Finish—Civil Rights, Quotas, and Dispa-
rate Impact in 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1043, 1067–70 (1993); see generally
Michael Selmi, The Supreme Court’s Surprising and Strategic Response to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 281, 287–89 (2011) (describing the
disagreements among President George H.W. Bush, Senate Republicans, and
Senate Democrats over proposed provisions of both the Civil Rights Act of 1990
and 1991).
125 See Bagenstos, supra note 30, at 13. R
126 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2523 (2015).
127 Id. at 2522–23.
128 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
129 Id. at 671–72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sponded that such a stringent standard “would be almost im-
possible for most employers to meet” and would therefore put
pressure on employers to adopt quota systems.130  Congress
responded to this aspect of Wards Cove in another hard-
fought, carefully negotiated provision of the Civil Rights Act of
1991.  That provision states that, where an employment prac-
tice causes a disparate impact, the employer must “demon-
strate that the challenged practice is job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity.”131  This
compromise, which combined relatively lenient language (“job
related,” “consistent with”) with stringent language (“business
necessity”), has left courts uncertain of just how strong an
employer’s interest must be to justify a practice with a dispa-
rate impact.132  But there is little question that Congress in-
creased the burden of justification on employers in such cases.
How strong an interest does Inclusive Communities require
in the housing context?  The Court’s opinion contains language
pointing both ways.  On the one hand, some of the opinion’s
language seems to suggest any valid interest will do.  For exam-
ple, the Court said that “[d]isparate-impact liability mandates
the ‘removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers,’
not the displacement of valid governmental policies.”133  But
elsewhere the Court described the defendant’s burden in much
more stringent terms, at least in terms of tailoring: “housing
authorities and private developers [must] be allowed to main-
tain a policy if they can prove it is necessary to achieve a valid
interest.”134
Although Inclusive Communities emphatically does not re-
solve the question, the latter, more stringent, reading of the
defendant’s burden seems more consistent with the overall
thrust of the Court’s opinion.  If disparate impact plays a key
role in “our Nation’s continuing struggle against racial isola-
tion,”135 liability ought not to be defeasible based on any old
legitimate interest.  Rather, it should be met by an interest that
130 See id. at 659.
131 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
132 See generally Melissa Hart, From Wards Cove to Ricci: Struggling Against
the “Built-in Headwinds” of a Skeptical Court, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 271
(2011) (“[A]lthough the 1991 Act was quite explicit in rejecting Wards Cove, the
statute still left considerable uncertainty about core interpretive questions—in-
cluding what constitutes an ‘employment practice’ subject to challenge and pre-
cisely what ‘business necessity’ means—in disparate impact litigation.”).
133 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2522 (2015) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
134 Id. at 2523.
135 Id. at 2525.
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is weighty enough to justify prioritizing it, in a given instance,
over “our ‘historic commitment to creating an integrated soci-
ety.’”136  As the Court’s opinion explains, one such instance
might occur where the challenged practices serve real health
and safety interests.137  In other cases, concerns about integra-
tion and avoiding racial isolation may appear on both sides of a
challenged decision—such as where a government agency
must choose between improving housing in “a blighted inner-
city neighborhood” or creating new low-income housing in the
suburbs.138  But all of this is a far cry from holding that any
merely legitimate interest will justify a practice with a signifi-
cant disparate impact.  Still, the Court’s “valid interest” lan-
guage will doubtless cause confusion and disagreement.
Whether the opinion effects a meaningful weakening of the
burden of justifying practices with a disparate impact will only
become apparent with time.
II
THE ROLE OF CLASSIFICATION AND MOTIVATION
IN EQUAL PROTECTION
In this Part, I turn from Inclusive Communities itself to the
constitutional analysis that underlies that decision.  I elaborate
on what that constitutional analysis means and argue that it
fits with a fair reading of the prior cases.  In defending the
Court’s analysis doctrinally in the light of prior cases, I do not
mean to suggest that the Court’s analysis tracks the way I
would have decided the case if I could write on a blank slate.
To the contrary, I believe that there are substantial problems
with the Court’s approach, as I show particularly in Part II.D.
below.  But I nonetheless hope to show that the Court’s ap-
proach probably reflects the best available one consistent with
prior cases.
Two points deserve emphasis here.  First, although it does
not represent the right-most available position on race and
equal protection, nobody should mistake the Inclusive Commu-
nities analysis as a turn to the left.139  In drawing a distinction
136 Id. (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)).
137 See id. at 2524 (stating that governments “must not be prevented from
achieving legitimate objectives, such as ensuring compliance with health and
safety codes”).
138 Id. at 2523.
139 Professor Siegel shows how even the more “liberal” race decisions of the
Roberts Court are best seen, when “situat[ed] . . . in a wider equal protection field,”
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between individual racial classifications and race-conscious-
but-race-neutral efforts to overcome segregation and racial iso-
lation, Inclusive Communities made clear, as Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Parents Involved did before it, that a majority of
the Court remained extremely skeptical of affirmative action
programs that give weight to an individual’s race in hiring,
school admission, or otherwise. Whether Justice Scalia’s de-
parture from the Court will alter this situation depends entirely
on whether his replacement takes a position to Justice Ken-
nedy’s left on these issues.
Second, in rejecting the syllogistic position that Washing-
ton v. Davis plus Adarand means that disparate impact
prohibitions are necessarily unconstitutional, the Inclusive
Communities ruling shows that the principle of “consistency”
that the Adarand Court identified—that “[t]he standard of re-
view under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on
the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classifi-
cation”140—is crucially dependent on whether a particular ac-
tion counts as a “classification” in the first place.  The Court
has never been clear as to what constitutes a “classifica-
tion.”141 Inclusive Communities continues to leave questions
regarding the circumstances in which a formally race-neutral
action will be labeled a “classification,” but it does make clear
that simply intending to achieve a racially defined goal is not
sufficient to warrant that label.142  I defend the Court’s analysis
on that point, in light of prior cases, below.
as applying a quite conservative jurisprudence. See Siegel, Equality Divided,
supra note 7, at 61–62. R
140 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (quoting City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
141 For prior work highlighting the uncertainty regarding what counts as a
“classification” under the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, see generally
Primus, supra note 16, at 509–13; see also Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: An- R
tisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over
Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1542–43 (2004) (“American antidiscrimination
law has no determinate criteria for deciding what practices are group-based clas-
sifications, and while courts sometimes articulate such criteria, they often apply
them inconsistently; as this inconsistency reveals, judgments about whether
practices are constitutionally suspect classifications are normative as well as
positive.”).  Probably the most systematic attempt to unpack the way the Court
has interpreted the concept of classification appears in Stephen M. Rich, Inferred
Classifications, 99 VA. L. REV. 1525 (2013).
142 See Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2525 (“When setting their larger
goals, local housing authorities may choose to foster diversity and combat racial
isolation with race-neutral tools, and mere awareness of race in attempting to
solve the problems facing inner cities does not doom that endeavor at the
outset.”).
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A. Why the Effort to Achieve Racial Integration or Close
Racial Gaps Should Not Trigger Strict Scrutiny
Under the Court’s Cases
At some level, it should be obvious that merely seeking to
achieve goals like integrating the races, avoiding racial isola-
tion, or reducing racial disparities cannot render unconstitu-
tional actions that do not themselves classify individuals based
on race.  Countless public policy interventions, supported by
liberals and conservatives, aim at achieving these sorts of ra-
cial goals, even though the interventions are race-neutral on
their face.143  As Professor Kim Forde-Mazrui explained a dec-
ade and a half ago, if all efforts to close racial gaps are constitu-
tionally suspect, than the government cannot engage in a range
of undoubtedly salutary, facially race-neutral actions without
satisfying strict scrutiny:
The government cannot, in response to the poor academic
achievement of minority schoolchildren, seek to address the
conditions that undermine their education, such as poor
quality schools, poverty, or family breakdown, even if disad-
vantaged children of all races, including white, are benefited.
The government cannot, in response to the high rates of un-
employment and crime in minority communities, seek to en-
hance employment opportunities or strengthen law
enforcement, even if such services are provided to communi-
ties of all races experiencing similar conditions.  The govern-
ment cannot, in response to the high rate of AIDS and other
diseases among minorities, increase public health education
even if high-risk communities of all races are targeted.144
In fact, the problem is worse than Forde-Mazrui suggests.
Even laws prohibiting intentional race discrimination aim at the
143 See Norton, supra note 51, at 233–34; Siegel, Antibalkanization, supra note R
7, at 1313–14 (“When proponents of colorblindness contest the constitutionality R
of race-conscious but facially neutral laws that employ no racial classifications,
the claim is potentially vast in reach (does it reach all civil rights laws? the
census?), and the value that colorblindness vindicates is by no means clear.”).  In
the field of education alone, the No Child Left Behind Act specifically describes a
purpose of closing “the achievement gaps between minority and nonminority stu-
dents.”  20 U.S.C. § 6301(3) (2012).  Many conservatives explicitly invoke the de-
sire to close racial achievement gaps as a justification for supporting a broad
policy of school choice through vouchers.  None of these programs would treat
minority children differently than nonminority children based on individual clas-
sifications, but they are clearly aimed at least in part at improving the position of
members of a particular racial group.
144 Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirma-
tive Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2348 (2000).  To similar effect, see R. Richard
Banks, The Benign-Invidious Asymmetry in Equal Protection Analysis, 31 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 573, 580–81 (2003).
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race-based goal of closing economic and other gaps between
majority and minority groups.145  If such a race-conscious
motivation is enough to render a facially race-neutral law con-
stitutionally suspect, then all of our race-based antidiscrimina-
tion laws are in trouble—not just the ones that prohibit actions
with an unjustified disparate impact.146
The Court has not, of course, held that laws prohibiting
intentional racial discrimination deny equal protection.  In-
deed, a number of aspects of the Court’s pre-Inclusive Commu-
nities jurisprudence support the conclusion that such laws—
and other race-neutral actions designed to promote integration
and close racial gaps—raise no serious constitutional con-
cerns.147  The Adarand opinion itself, Professor Banks points
out, “arguably signal[ed] the Court’s unease with the implica-
tions of the coupling of the discriminatory purpose standard
and the consistency principle”148 by going out of its way to
“note” that “this case concerns only classifications based ex-
plicitly on race, and presents none of the additional difficulties
posed by laws that, although facially race-neutral, result in
racially disproportionate impact and are motivated by a racially
discriminatory purpose.”149
And in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,150
the Court upheld Proposal 2, a Michigan state constitutional
amendment that prohibited state agencies from any intentional
145 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 174 (“To assist black workers, within R
the confines of equal opportunity competition, was the primary aim animating the
coalition that ultimately succeeded in passing Title VII.”); Primus, supra note 16, R
at 525 (“African Americans and members of other disadvantaged groups are the
net beneficiaries of a ban on intentional discrimination, and the legislators who
passed Title VII understood that this was so.”).
146 See KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 173–74 (arguing that “[c]olor-blind im- R
mediatism” threatens “old-fashioned disparate-treatment antidiscrimination
law”); Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 46, at 108–09 (“Because all remedial R
measures on behalf of racial minorities can at some level be characterized as
racially attentive, treating racial attentiveness—attending to the racial conse-
quences of one’s actions—as a form of discriminatory motivation destabilizes
virtually all remedial options, even those expressly authorized by settled doctrine
and federal statutory law.”); Primus, supra note 16, at 525 (“If racially allocative R
motives raise equal protection problems in the context of affirmative action and
disparate impact liability, one might well ask whether such motives also present
problems for bans on intentional discrimination.”).
147 See Rich, supra note 141, at 1586 (arguing that “Croson, Grutter, Gratz, R
and Parents Involved” show “that even moderate and conservative members of the
Court have refused to equate all race conscious motivations with illicit discrimina-
tory purposes of the type that would trigger either strict scrutiny or invalidation
under Washington v. Davis and its progeny”).
148 Banks, supra note 144, at 578 n.30. R
149 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213 (1995).
150 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (plurality opinion).
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racial discrimination, including affirmative action programs.
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion affirmed that “[g]overnment
action that classifies individuals on the basis of race is inher-
ently suspect and carries the danger of perpetuating the very
racial divisions the polity seeks to transcend.”151  But Justice
Kennedy said that a neutral law like Proposal 2 is not unconsti-
tutional unless it “target[s] racial minorities” and thereby ef-
fects or aggravates “invidious discrimination.”152  In his
concurrence in the judgment, Justice Scalia disagreed with
aspects of Justice Kennedy’s analysis, but he nonetheless
found it significant that the amendment did not “distribut[e]
burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifica-
tions.”153  He explained that “[a] law that ‘neither says nor im-
plies that persons are to be treated differently on account of
their race’ is not a racial classification.”154
In addition, the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence
has long encouraged governments to engage in “race-neutral”
efforts to overcome patterns of discrimination.155  As a matter
of narrow tailoring, the Court has required governments first to
engage in a “serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives” for achieving its compelling interests
before employing racial classifications.156  Notably, none of the
justices who joined the majority opinion in Fisher v. University
of Texas expressed any doubt that the “Top Ten Percent plan,”
which was framed in race-neutral terms but plainly aimed at
increasing racial diversity,157 was constitutional.158  Even Jus-
151 Id. at 1634–35.
152 See id. at 1632.
153 Id. at 1648 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Parents In-
volved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007)).
154 Id. (quoting Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 537 (1982)).
155 See id. at 1639 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Universities in
other States can and should draw on the most promising aspects of these race-
neutral alternatives as they develop.” (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
342 (2003))).
156 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) (quoting
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339–40).
157 See id. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg concluded
that this racially driven motivation rendered the Top Ten Percent Plan not race-
neutral but race-conscious. See id. (“I have said before and reiterate here that
only an ostrich could regard the supposedly neutral alternatives as race uncon-
scious.”); id. (“It is race consciousness, not blindness to race, that drives such
plans.”).  But a plan can be formally race-neutral at the same time that it is
designed with a goal toward achieving integration or closing racial gaps.  It is
precisely those policies that fall within that overlap, Inclusive Communities makes
clear, that pose no serious constitutional problem.
158 See Siegel, Race-Conscious, supra note 7, at 674.  Writing after Ricci, Pro- R
fessor Marcus argued that “Title VII’s disparate impact provision, as currently
drafted, cannot survive a challenge based on the Equal Protection Clause.”  Ken-
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tice Scalia—who believed that race-based affirmative action is
never constitutional159—agreed that governments may consti-
tutionally engage in efforts to promote minority businesses “in
many permissible ways that do not involve classification by
race.”160  For example, he said in Croson, a state “may adopt a
preference for small businesses, or even for new businesses—
which would make it easier for those previously excluded by
discrimination to enter the field. Such programs may well have
racially disproportionate impact, but they are not based on
race.”161  As Professor Siegel points out, “Justice
Scalia . . . never reconciled” his Ricci suggestion “that disparate
impact may be unconstitutional” with “his own support for
race-conscious, race-neutral state action in the affirmative ac-
tion cases.”162
One can attempt to explain these examples away.  Perhaps
the race-neutral-alternatives language in the affirmative action
cases describes policies that will satisfy strict scrutiny, not
that will avoid strict scrutiny altogether.163  On this reading,
formally race-neutral tools, like small-business preferences,
may be more narrowly tailored than policies that explicitly clas-
sify based on race, but their avowedly race-conscious motiva-
tion should subject them to strict scrutiny to ensure that they
neth L. Marcus, The War Between Disparate Impact and Equal Protection, 2009
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 53, 83.  Notably, Marcus argued that, under his reading of
Ricci, the Texas Ten Percent Plan would trigger strict scrutiny because of its racial
motive. See id. at 73.
159 Justice Scalia said that he would have accepted preferences only for “iden-
tified victim[s] of state discrimination” at the hands of the government agency that
is providing the preference—preferences that would not be based on race but on
victim status.  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 526–27 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  He would have allowed states to engage
in race-based action only “where that is necessary to eliminate their own mainte-
nance of a system of unlawful racial classification.” Id. at 524.  “If, for example, a
state agency has a discriminatory pay scale compensating black employees in all
positions at 20% less than their nonblack counterparts, it may assuredly promul-
gate an order raising the salaries of ‘all black employees’ to eliminate the differen-
tial.” Id.; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that “government
can never have a ‘compelling interest’ in discriminating on the basis of race in
order to ‘make up’ for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction,” that
“[i]ndividuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be
made whole,” and that “under our Constitution there can be no such thing as
either a creditor or a debtor race”).
160 Croson, 448 U.S. at 526.
161 Id.
162 Siegel, Race-Conscious, supra note 7, at 676. R
163 See Banks, supra note 144, at 579 (arguing that the Court’s affirmative R
action cases “leave open the question whether race-neutral alternatives are con-
stitutional because they satisfy strict scrutiny or because they are exempt from
strict scrutiny”).
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are adopted for the right reasons.  After all, the Court has told
us that “the purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegiti-
mate uses of race” and to “ensure[ ] that the means chosen fit
[a] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility
that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype.”164
But that explanation does not fit.  If a race-neutral policy
like a small-business preference is subject to strict scrutiny, it
must both serve a compelling interest and be narrowly tailored.
Even if the lack of a formal racial classification makes the pol-
icy narrowly tailored, we still must identify a compelling inter-
est.  And that compelling interest, the Court has said, cannot
be the interest in remedying the effects of societal discrimina-
tion;165 instead, the unit of government that adopts the chal-
lenged policy must be responding to its own past
discrimination or to private discrimination in which it partici-
pated.166  A small-business preference is likely to have as diffi-
cult a time satisfying that compelling interest standard as was
the racial set-aside in Croson—yet a majority of justices in
Croson said that the formally race-neutral preference would be
constitutional.167  It is therefore not plausible that the Court’s
164 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion)); accord Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 333 (2003).  As Professor Siegel notes, the Court has sometimes described
narrow tailoring “as probing for suspect motives,” but it has other times—even in
the same cases—described narrow tailoring as “serv[ing] a very different function”
of “protecting ‘innocent persons’ from harm . . . when government is pursuing
important public ends.”  Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 7, at 46; see also Jed R
Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 440 (1997) (“Strict scrutiny is no
longer a means of smoking out concealed violations of constitutional principles.  It
is a means of ‘justif[ying]’ a conceded constitutional ‘injury.’” (quoting Adarand,
515 U.S. at 230)).  For a historical argument that “cost-justification,” rather than
“smoking out,” was the “original point” of strict scrutiny, but that “[u]ntil the
Burger and Rehnquist Court’s affirmative action decisions, heightened scrutiny of
suspect classifications was used to ferret out illicit motive while strict scrutiny of
fundamental interests focused on cost-justification,” see Stephen A. Siegel, The
Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 355, 394, 403–04 (2006).
165 See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909–10 (1996) (“[A]n effort to alleviate the
effects of societal discrimination is not a compelling interest.”).  Note that in Wy-
gant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), the plurality described
this principle with specific reference to racial classification: “Societal discrimina-
tion, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified
remedy.” Id. at 276 (plurality opinion).
166 See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 492 (plurality opinion) (“[I]f the city could
show that it had essentially become a ‘passive participant’ in a system of racial
exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry, we think it
clear that the city could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system.”).
167 See id. at 509.
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decision contemplates applying strict scrutiny to such race-
neutral preferences.
What about Schuette?  That case, after all, involved a state
law that did nothing more than prohibit racial classifica-
tions.168  How can a law that prohibits racial classifications
itself constitute a racial classification?  But that response
seems to me to give away the ball game.  To say that laws
prohibiting racial classifications raise no constitutional
problems, we must believe either that facially neutral laws al-
ways raise no constitutional problems or that a mere racial
motivation for a facially neutral law does not raise a constitu-
tional problem—at least where it is the right sort of motivation.
Either way, the fact that lawmakers have race on the mind is
not sufficient to subject such a law to strict scrutiny.  The
Schuette plurality clearly suggested that what matters is
whether the state intended to harm minorities—not simply
whether it was attempting to achieve a racial result.
Perhaps Schuette seems like too easy a case, because Pro-
posal 2 applied only to state action, not to private action.  The
Equal Protection Clause already prohibits most racial classifi-
cations by states, so a state’s decision to go a step farther and
prohibit itself from engaging in all racial classifications hardly
seems problematic.169  But do we seriously think the result in
Schuette would have been any different if the case had involved
a law regulating private action?  Imagine a state decided that:
(a) members of racial minority groups were, in general, in worse
economic situations than whites; (b) intentional discrimination
by private employers was a significant reason for that disparity;
(c) most intentional discrimination by private employers oper-
ated to the detriment of members of minority groups; and
therefore (d) to close the racial economic gap, it would pass a
law prohibiting all intentional racial discrimination by private
employers.  (This is surely the analysis many Members of Con-
gress went through in deciding to vote for the Civil Rights Act of
1964.)  If the obvious racial motive behind the law rendered it
the equivalent of a racial classification, subject to strict scru-
tiny under the Supreme Court’s precedents, the law might have
a hard time satisfying the compelling interest standard.  It is
certainly possible to tell a story that state discrimination en-
168 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1629
(2014).
169 See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 709 (9th Cir.) (“The
Fourteenth Amendment, lest we lose sight of the forest for the trees, does not
require what it barely permits.”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997).
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couraged and interacted with private discrimination such that
a prohibition on private employment discrimination responds
to the state’s own past discrimination.  After all, there can be
little doubt that all levels of government have been deeply in-
volved in various systems of private discrimination throughout
our history.  It is not clear the Court would find that the gov-
ernment’s involvement was closely enough related to all acts of
private discrimination to constitute a compelling interest,
though.170  And is there any reason to believe that the state
would be put to the burden of establishing the causal link
between its own past discrimination and current private dis-
crimination to justify a law that does nothing more than pro-
hibit private intentional discrimination?  No Supreme Court
case since perhaps the Civil Rights Cases171 has come close to
saying that the state must carry any such burden.
Nonetheless, I believe that many people see a distinction
between prohibitions on intentional discrimination by private
parties and prohibitions on practices with an unjustified dispa-
rate impact.  The former prohibit conduct that most of us be-
lieve to be wrong in itself, while the latter prohibit conduct that
is wrong, if at all, only because of its effects in the world.  The
former seem to rectify an injustice, while the latter seem redis-
tributive.172  But private entities generally have the power to
hire and fire particular employees for any reason or no reason
at all.173  A law overriding that baseline rule to prohibit inten-
tional race discrimination by private employers does not simply
restore what the Constitution itself requires; it goes beyond
what the Constitution requires in order to achieve a racially
defined result.174  If such a law is not a racial classification,
despite its racial motivation, it’s hard to see why an equally
neutrally phrased law overriding that baseline rule to prohibit
practices with an unjustified disparate impact would be.  In
170 The Court has, for example, tended to require proof of a close link between
private housing choices and school segregation in its desegregation cases. See,
e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495–96 (1992).
171 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  The Civil Rights Cases, of course, involved the extent of
federal power rather than the limitations imposed by equal protection.
172 See Primus, supra note 16, at 527.  As Professor Siegel notes, this baseline R
question was central to debates over disparate impact in the 1980s. See Siegel,
Race-Conscious, supra note 7, at 663–65. R
173 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH.
L. REV. 225, 244–45 (2013).
174 Civil rights laws that prohibit private intentional discrimination have long
been controversial for precisely this reason. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unre-
lenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV.
1205, 1207 (2014).
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other words, if it is permissible to shift from an at-will baseline
to one in which private employers do not engage in intentional
discrimination, it should not be any less permissible to shift
from an at-will baseline to one in which private employers do
not adopt selection criteria that have an unjustified disparate
impact.  In both cases, the law changes the preexisting com-
mon-law baseline in order to achieve a racially defined end.  In
both cases, the law does so to overcome the legacy of segrega-
tion and racial isolation.175
B. Explaining Ricci, Adarand, and Davis
The conclusion that formally race-neutral laws that aim to
overcome racial gaps and the legacy of segregation are consti-
tutional without strict scrutiny thus seems to accord with first
principles, as well as key holdings from the Supreme Court.
But that conclusion nonetheless strikes many as inconsistent
with the Court’s cases.176  What accounts for this reaction?  I
would argue that the reaction is based on an understandable,
but unnecessary and unduly formalistic, reading of Ricci,
Adarand, and Washington v. Davis.  Exploring how the princi-
ple of Justice Kennedy’s Parents Involved concurrence and the
Inclusive Communities opinion can in fact be reconciled with
these earlier cases helps us understand the scope of that prin-
ciple, and of the role of classification and motivation in current
equal protection jurisprudence.
In Ricci, New Haven’s refusal to certify the promotion tests
could be understood as formally race-neutral.177  All the city
decided was that it was not going to use the tests that it had
administered as a basis for deciding whom to promote.178  The
city did not say that any particular firefighters would or would
not get promotions based on their race, nor did it even choose
how it would ultimately make promotion decisions.  Yet the
Court nonetheless concluded that the city’s decision consti-
tuted intentional discrimination.179
175 For an analogous argument rejecting efforts to distinguish between an-
tidiscrimination and accommodation rules on the ground that the former involve
mere corrective justice while the latter are redistributive, see Samuel R. Bagen-
stos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil
Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003).
176 See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 55, at 2180 (arguing that, based on Ricci R
and prior equal protection cases, “Title VII’s disparate-impact provision can with-
stand constitutional attack only if it satisfies strict scrutiny—that is, if it is nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest”).
177 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 574 (2009).
178 See id.
179 See id. at 592–93.
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One way of reading the Ricci Court’s holding, as we have
seen, is that even formally race-neutral efforts to avoid racially
disparate impacts are the equivalent of racial classifications.180
But that was never the only way to read the Court’s holding.
The Ricci Court appeared to find it crucial that the city acted
after it administered the examinations and saw who had high
enough scores to be promoted, candidates identified only by
their race.181  A fair reading of the Ricci opinion is that, by
refusing to certify the test after learning which firefighters
would be affected, because of the race of those firefighters, the
city classified those firefighters on the basis of their race.182  As
Professor Siegel puts it, “[w]hat made New Haven’s actions
problematic” was “the irregular way in which the City complied
with disparate impact law: by offering openly race-related rea-
sons for changing promotion standards for an identified group
of applicants who had already tested for the job.”183  The Court
may thus have concluded that the city’s action was not a for-
mally race-neutral action with a racial intent but instead a
racial classification.  This reading of Ricci, which overlaps with
what Richard Primus called the “visible-victims” reading, was
always at least a plausible understanding of the case.184  And it
is fully consistent with the Court’s holding in Inclusive
Communities.185
What about Adarand and Davis?  The argument that the
Parents Involved-Inclusive Communities principle conflicts with
these cases is straightforward enough: Adarand’s “consistency”
principle provides that “[t]he standard of review under the
Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those
180 See supra Part I.A.
181 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585, 593 (“[O]nce that process has been established
and employers have made clear their selection criteria, they may not then invali-
date the test results, thus upsetting an employee’s legitimate expectation not to be
judged on the basis of race.”).
182 See Adams, supra note 51, at 842 (“The central problem in Ricci was that R
the government refused to certify the examination results only after it learned that
‘white candidates had outperformed minority candidates.’ From this perspective,
the government created racial harm when it divested specific, identifiable individ-
uals of a ‘vested right’ to their promotions.”) (footnote omitted).
183 Siegel, Race-Conscious, supra note 7, at 682. R
184 See Primus, supra note 51, at 1345.  Professor Primus defines the “visible- R
victims reading” as holding “that the problem in New Haven’s case was not the
race-consciousness of the city’s decision per se but the fact that the decision
disadvantaged determinate and visible innocent third parties—that is, the white
firefighters.”  Primus, supra note 51, at 1345. R
185 See Primus, supra note 68, at 18 (“Inclusive Communities again sounded R
the basic concerns of the visibility paradigm as they apply to disparate-impact
standards.”).
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burdened or benefited by a particular classification.”186  The
Adarand Court held that strict scrutiny applies to all racial
classifications, because it concluded that “all governmental ac-
tion based on race—a group classification long recognized as ‘in
most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited’—
should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that
the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been
infringed.”187  And the Court held that whether a racial classifi-
cation has a good or bad motivation is relevant only to whether
the classification satisfies strict scrutiny, not to the prior ques-
tion whether strict scrutiny applies.188 Davis, of course, held
that “an invidious discriminatory purpose” triggers “the
rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strict-
est scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of
considerations.”189
Adding these precedents together, as we have seen, it
might seem that a law that is race-neutral in operation but
designed to achieve the goal of racial integration triggers strict
scrutiny.  Whether the legislature’s motive is good or bad
should not matter, per Adarand, and a racial purpose will, per
Davis, transform a facially neutral law into the equivalent of a
racial classification.
Consider “strategic site selection of new schools,” which
Justice Kennedy in Parents Involved gave as an example of
race-neutral actions that do not trigger strict scrutiny.190  If a
district chose to place a new school in the middle of an over-
whelmingly white area, and it did so in order to ensure that the
student body was itself overwhelmingly white, there is no ques-
tion that the district’s action would violate the Constitution.191
The Court held as much in Keyes v. Denver School District No.
One.192  Given Adarand’s consistency principle, how can the
result be any different simply because a school district seeks to
186 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (quoting City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
187 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (citation omitted) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
188 See id. at 226.
189 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (citation omitted).
190 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
789 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
191 See Michelle Adams, Racial Inclusion, Exclusion and Segregation in Consti-
tutional Law, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 33 (2012) (“If the government were to take
facially race-neutral actions with an intent to segregate, there is little question
that strict scrutiny would not only apply but that such actions would be struck
down as a violation of the Equal Protection clause.”).
192 See 413 U.S. 189, 213–14 (1973).
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integrate, not separate, students of different races?  Perhaps
the use of school site-selection to integrate will satisfy strict
scrutiny, where the effort to separate will not, but is there any
reason to avoid engaging in the inquiry?
I believe this analysis makes too much of some of
Adarand’s language and ignores the context in which that lan-
guage appeared.  Although the Court said that “all governmen-
tal action based on race” triggers strict scrutiny,193 it did not
specify whether an action is “based on race” for these purposes
simply because it has a race-conscious motivation. Adarand,
of course, involved a government program that on its face dis-
criminated on the basis of race—and the Court’s statement of
its “consistency” principle expressly refers only to laws that,
similarly, classify individuals on the basis of their race: “[t]he
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not
dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a
particular classification.”194  As we have seen, the Adarand
Court expressly distanced itself from the conclusion that its
holding would apply to “facially race neutral” laws.195  And
though Davis holds that a facially neutral law with “an invidi-
ous discriminatory purpose” is the equivalent of a racial classi-
fication,196 the Court has never applied this principle to hold
that a facially neutral law that was intended to overcome segre-
gation or close racial gaps was such an equivalent.197
Perhaps the closest the Court has come is in subjecting
redistricting plans that are neutral on their face, and lack an
intent to dilute any group’s voting strength, to strict scrutiny if
“race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s
decision to place a significant number of voters within or with-
out a particular district.”198  “To make this showing,” the Court
has said, “a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordi-
nated traditional race-neutral districting principles . . . to racial
193 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
194 Id. at 224 (emphasis added) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
195 Id. at 213; see supra text accompanying notes 148–149. R
196 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241–42 (1976).
197 See Siegel, Race-Conscious, supra note 7, at 671 (“Not all race-conscious R
purposes are discriminatory purposes within the meaning of Davis-Feeney; gov-
ernment may engage in race-conscious state action to remedy past discrimina-
tion, promote equal opportunity, and achieve diversity, in cases where the law is
facially neutral in form.”).
198 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).  For discussion of these cases,
see Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action
After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1573–94 (2002); Rich,
supra note 141, at 1547–58. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-5\CRN502.txt unknown Seq: 40 30-JUN-16 15:38
1154 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1115
considerations.”199  These cases may be understood as based
on the unique dynamics of the districting process, as the Court
has not applied the “predominant motive” standard elsewhere.
Instead, it has found a discriminatory purpose where racial
harm was merely a motivating factor, not the predominant mo-
tive.200  Moreover, it is worth noting that the Court understood
these redistricting cases as involving facially neutral practices
that, far from integrating the races, in fact were designed to
“segregate” them.201  Disparate impact prohibitions, by con-
trast, both are designed to integrate and, by incorporating a
business-justification defense, necessarily lack the predomi-
nant racial motive the redistricting cases would demand.
C. Reasons for Using Classification as a Trigger for Strict
Scrutiny
The pre-Inclusive Communities cases provide plausible rea-
sons to distinguish between actions that themselves classify
individuals based on their race—to which strict scrutiny al-
ways applies, regardless of the motivation behind them—and
those that are neutral in their operation—which trigger strict
scrutiny only when their intent is to segregate or exclude,
rather than to integrate or close racial gaps.  Most of the
Court’s modern jurisprudence on “benign” discrimination has
focused directly on the specific harms that occur when the
government classifies individuals, and distributes benefits or
burdens to them, based on their race.202  The Court has thus
explained that “judicial review must begin from the position
199 Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.  As Professor Karlan shows, the Court has inter-
preted this standard not to demand strict scrutiny even in cases where the Court
seems to have concluded there was a discriminatory motivation in the Davis
sense.  In Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001), she notes, “it seem[ed] quite
clear that the Supreme Court [wa]s prepared to conclude that North Carolina
selected the challenged plan ‘at least in part “because of,” not merely “in spite of,”’
the racial composition of the districts,” but “the Court did not apply strict scru-
tiny,” because “race was just one factor among many.”  Karlan, supra note 198, at R
1586.
200 See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227–28 (1985) (stating that
when the law’s challengers show racial discrimination was a motivating factor, the
burden “shifts to the law’s defenders”).
201 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649, 652 (1993) (finding plaintiffs had stated
a claim that the challenged districting plan “rationally cannot be understood as
anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on
the basis of race without sufficient justification”).
202 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 720 (2007) (“It is well established that when the government distributes
burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is
reviewed under strict scrutiny.”) (emphasis added); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 904 (1995) (“Laws classifying citizens on the basis of race cannot be upheld
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that ‘any official action that treats a person differently on ac-
count of his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect.’”203  And
the Court has justified strict scrutiny based on the premise
that “when government decisions ‘touch upon an individual’s
race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determina-
tion that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is pre-
cisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.’”204
Justice Kennedy’s Parents Involved concurrence explained that
individual racial classifications like these present unique dan-
gers—dangers that he believed do not exist to the same extent
when the government seeks to achieve race-conscious ends
through race-neutral means:
When the government classifies an individual by race, it
must first define what it means to be of a race.  Who exactly is
white and who is nonwhite?  To be forced to live under a
state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity of
individuals in our society.  And it is a label that an individual
is powerless to change.  Governmental classifications that
command people to march in different directions based on
racial typologies can cause a new divisiveness.  The practice
can lead to corrosive discourse, where race serves not as an
element of our diverse heritage but instead as a bargaining
chip in the political process.205
Unpacking this passage, it points to a number of distinct
harms caused by laws that classify individuals based on their
race.  Such government actions may reify racial categories,
thus denying individuals the opportunity to exploit the fluidity
of a socially constructed status and define their identities for
themselves.  “[F]orc[ing]” someone “to live under a state-man-
dated racial label” that she “is powerless to change” raises lib-
ertarian concerns206 at the same time as it has uncomfortable
historical resonances.207  And requiring different treatment of
unless they are narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state interest.”) (em-
phasis added).
203 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (emphasis
added) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 (1980) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)).
204 Id. at 2417 (emphasis added) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
205 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
206 Id.; see also Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal
Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119 (2007) (“When the state moves from . . . the
domain to the individual, Kennedy’s libertarian instincts reemerge.”).
207 See, e.g., Fulllilove, 448 U.S. at 534 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If the
National Government is to make a serious effort to define racial classes by criteria
that can be administered objectively, it must study precedents such as the First
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people who are assigned to different racial categories (“com-
mand[ing] people to march in different directions based on ra-
cial typologies”) may increase divisiveness and entrench the
significance of race as a source of social conflict and individual
animus.208  Although formally race-neutral policies might also
lead to divisiveness if the public understood them as “really”
aiming to assist members of a particular racial group,209 the
concerns about reification, individual freedom, and historical
resonances seem more attenuated for such policies.
On the other side of the ledger, if strict scrutiny applied to
any action taken to reduce racial gaps or bring the races to-
gether—no matter how race-neutral that action was in its oper-
ation—the law would impose daunting barriers to efforts to
promote integration.210  And the law would do so without a
powerful justification.  To be sure, it is possible to envision an
extreme form of colorblindness under which the government
must not even consider the racial effects of its actions.  Such a
view would rest on a thoroughgoing individualism, which
would dictate that the government should care only about the
welfare of individuals and not about the position of any of the
groups of which they are members.211  But precious few people
hold to this position, and virtually nobody holds to it consist-
ently.212  Our political discourse is filled with assertions, from
all points on the political spectrum, that particular policies
(race-neutral in form) will operate to close racial gaps.213  Liber-
als argue that infrastructure spending and jobs programs will
close racial gaps in economics, while conservatives argue that
school choice will close racial gaps in education.  Although
there are great disputes about which policies will in fact close
racial gaps, there is little disagreement in our political system
Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935 . . . .”).  In his
dissenting opinion in the Metro Broadcasting case, after quoting Justice Stevens’s
reference to the Nuremburg Laws, Justice Kennedy said: “Other examples are
available.  See Population Registration Act No. 30 of 1950, Statutes of the Repub-
lic of South Africa 71 (1985).”  Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 633 n.1
(1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
208 See Siegel, Antibalkanization, supra note 7, at 1307. R
209 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on
Voting Rights After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2852–54 (2014).
210 See supra text accompanying notes 143–146. R
211 See Randall Kennedy, Colorblind Constitutionalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1,
14 (2013) (quoting statements of Ward Connerly seemingly espousing such an
individualist view).
212 See id. at 14–15 (arguing that Connerly’s “rigorous and immediatist color-
blind constitutionalism is yet to be fully ascendant,” and that it should be
rejected).
213 See id. at 2–3.
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that closing those gaps is a proper function of public policy.
And, as I have noted, the Court has never challenged the con-
stitutionality of such a legislative goal.
The failure to appreciate this point has led some commen-
tators astray.  Professor Rosenthal, for example, finds “formi-
dable doctrinal obstacles” to the “visible-victims” reading of
Ricci.214  Rosenthal argues that “the existence of something
approaching a vested or reliance interest in obtaining a govern-
mental benefit is not required to attack a race-conscious reme-
dial program.”215  For support, he points to the Court’s
holdings that “even when a litigant cannot prove that he will
receive a concrete benefit absent the use of race-conscious cri-
teria—in other words, even absent a ‘visible victim’—the liti-
gant nevertheless may challenge the practice because being
subjected to a discriminatory competitive process is a legally
cognizable injury.”216
If the reading I have offered is correct, Professor Rosenthal
is missing the point.  The visibility of the victims mattered in
Ricci not because that made the Court more certain of who
suffered an injury, but because that made the Court more cer-
tain that what looked like a race-neutral act (declining to certify
the tests and refusing to promote anyone) was a racial classifi-
cation.217  In each of the cases Professor Rosenthal cites—Par-
ents Involved, Gratz, and Adarand—the defendants were
concededly acting on the basis of the race of the particular
individuals who sought a benefit from them.218  Students of the
“right” racial group got a preference in admissions to the
schools they desired in Parents Involved and Gratz,219 and bus-
iness owners of the “right” racial group got a preference in
receiving contracts in Adarand.220  Whether or not we knew
precisely who was denied a seat in school, or a government
contract, as a result of the challenged preferences, we knew
that the defendants classified each individual who applied for
these benefits on the basis of that individual’s race.  In Ricci,
the mere act of refusing to certify the test did not classify any
214 Rosenthal, supra note 55, at 2199. R
215 Id. at 2200.
216 Id. (citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 718–19 (2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 260–62
(2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995)).
217 See id. at 2169 (discussing the idea that refusing to promote anyone was
racial classification).
218 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 701; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244; Adarand,
515 U.S. at 200.
219 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S at 718; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 272.
220 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-5\CRN502.txt unknown Seq: 44 30-JUN-16 15:38
1158 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1115
individual based on his race; rather, it was the act of refusing
to certify the test specifically because city officials did not want
to promote individuals with known racial identifications, and
even more specifically because of the effect that promoting
them would have on the racial composition of the supervisory
force in the fire department.221  Absent such a classification,
the Court has never held that the use of race-neutral tools to
achieve integration or close racial gaps is subject to strict
scrutiny.222
Similarly, Professor Rosenthal argues that strict scrutiny
of disparate impact laws is inevitable because “unless one is
prepared to endorse any kind of preference for women or mi-
norities, no matter what the justification, it is extraordinarily
difficult to disentangle such preferences from strict or at least
some form of heightened scrutiny.”223  But the Parents Involved
concurrence and the opinion for the Court in Inclusive Commu-
nities show that, at least for Justice Kennedy, there is a big
difference between a classification—a practice that assigns a
racial label to individuals and accords them different treatment
because of it—and a practice that does not classify individuals
based on race but that seeks to achieve the goal of racial inte-
gration.224  Classifications, in Justice Kennedy’s view, are sub-
ject to strict scrutiny.  Race-neutral efforts to promote
integration and close racial gaps are not.  Whatever the justifi-
cations for the “consistency” principle when the government
actually classifies individuals based on race, the Court has not
applied that principle to such race-neutral efforts.
If that is so, a critic might ask, why should race-neutral
policies that aim to harm minorities be subject to strict scru-
tiny?  We know from Davis, Keyes, and many other cases that a
facially race-neutral act with a motivation to harm minorities is
the constitutional equivalent of a racial classification.  But if
221 See Ricci v DeStefano 557 U.S. 557, 563 (2009).
222 To be sure, as Professor Rich notes, the ambiguity in what constitutes a
“classification” does give the Court room to require strict scrutiny for those
“facially neutral measures” that appear to the Court to risk “the same constitu-
tional equality harms ordinarily associated with the use of explicit racial classifi-
cations[, which] are being perpetrated by facially neutral means.” Rich, supra note
141, at 1586. Ricci is an example of such a case.  But that is not the same thing R
as saying that all efforts to achieve racial integration through race-neutral means
constitute classifications that trigger strict scrutiny.  Still, it reflects an instability
in the formalistic concept of classification that makes the Court’s approach less
than ideal.  I address this point in Part II.D., below.
223 Rosenthal, supra note 55, at 2207. R
224 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (stating that there is a difference between racial
classification and race conscious decisions that lead to integration).
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equal protection doctrine aims at the unique harms caused by
formal racial classifications, why should it be a constitutional
problem to adopt a facially neutral policy with a discriminatory
intent, at least outside a case like Ricci in which the policy
targets identified individuals because of their race?  Is there a
principled way to distinguish between the intent to integrate
the races and close racial gaps, on the one hand, and the intent
to harm minorities, on the other?  Or is it just a matter of whose
ox is gored?225
It is plausible to argue, as Professor Banks does, that the
cases leave room for a jurisprudence that does depend on
whose ox is gored.226  But even if that is not the best reading of
those cases, there is an important distinction between efforts to
harm members of particular racial groups and efforts to pro-
mote integration or close racial gaps.  It may be easiest to see
this in the context of promoting integration.  When policymak-
ers seek to promote the integration of schools (as through the
race-conscious but race-neutral tools Justice Kennedy identi-
fied in Parents Involved) or of workplaces (through the race-
conscious but race-neutral tool of disparate-impact liability),
they are not seeking to harm any particular group—or any
individual member of such a group.  Instead, they are seeking
to create circumstances in which all members of all racial
225 Professor Siegel reads Davis, Keyes, and related cases as reflecting judicial
deference or withdrawal.  On her account, the Burger Court in these cases was
making the decision that the courts were not well suited to address discriminatory
effects, but that “few imagined equal protection as a judicially enforceable limit on
representative government’s authority to redress de facto segregation.”  Siegel,
Equality Divided, supra note 7, at 11.  As a historical account of what was on the R
justices’ minds at the time, Siegel’s argument is persuasive.  But that is a different
question than whether the doctrinal principle the Court adopted must nonethe-
less be read to render it constitutionally suspect for the government to seek to
overcome de facto segregation.  Siegel notes that Davis itself states that extension
of disparate-impact liability should depend on “legislative prescription,” Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976), not judicial fiat.  Siegel, Equality Divided,
supra note 7, at 21.  But whatever that says about the justices’ expectations, that R
is not the same as a holding that the Court would necessarily uphold a disparate
impact provision if challenged.  For example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985), the Court held that classifications based on
intellectual disability do not trigger heightened scrutiny, but its language sug-
gested that a “congressional direction” to the contrary would be “controlling.”  In
Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), however, the Court held that
Congress had exceeded its authority in making just such a direction.  In text, I
attempt to explain why the logic of Davis and related cases accords with the
justices’ expectations and does not require strict scrutiny of race-neutral efforts to
respond to de facto segregation.
226 See generally Banks, supra note 144 (arguing that whether a policy is R
characterized as benign or invidious usually influences the level of scrutiny to
which the policy will be subject).
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groups have fair access to opportunity.227  And they are trying
to promote an outcome that has benefits for members of all
races, as well as for democracy as a whole.228  Such efforts do
not represent a mere imposition of harm on a disfavored racial
group or a transfer to a favored group.  They represent an effort
to disestablish entrenched divisions in American society, divi-
sions created by historic and continuing injustices.
Of course, whether these entrenched divisions reflect past
injustices or simply different choices and abilities that happen
to correlate with group membership is a longstanding subject
of debate.  As Professor Siegel emphasizes, critics of disparate
impact and other civil rights laws have long tended to see “un-
derrepresentation of minorities as evidence of racial group dif-
ferences in taste or aptitude.”229  In his dissent in Inclusive
Communities, Justice Thomas made precisely the point Profes-
sor Siegel highlights.  Invoking examples across time and conti-
nents in which racial and ethnic minorities have had
disproportionate success in several spheres, he argued that
“[t]o presume that these and all other measurable disparities
are products of racial discrimination is to ignore the complexi-
ties of human existence.”230  But the question here is not
whether “all . . . measurable disparities”231 are products of
discrimination.  It is whether persistent racial isolation in
housing patterns, consistent racial disparities in wealth ac-
cumulation, ongoing racial gaps in education, and so forth, are
likely attributable to the effects of discrimination in the United
227 See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 616
F.2d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1980) (describing integration programs as “ ‘reshuffle’
programs, in which the state neither gives to nor withholds from anyone any
benefits because of that person’s group status, but rather ensures that everyone
in every group enjoys the same rights in the same place,” and distinguishing them
from “‘stacked deck’ programs, in which the state specifically favors members of
minorities in the competition with members of the majority for benefits that the
state can give to some citizens but not to all”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980).
228 See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 93 (2010)
(“The promise of political equality is a sham without social equality in the institu-
tions of civil society.  Political equality in the realm of governance cannot be
realized without a democratic culture pervading civil society.”).  For an argument
that integration in housing and education benefits democracy, see KIRWAN INST.
FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC INTE-
GRATION IN OUR EDUCATION SYSTEM: WHY THIS MATTERS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY (2009).
For an argument about the democratic benefits of integration in the workplace,
see CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003).
229 Siegel, Antibalkanization, supra note 7, at 1320 & n.128. R
230 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2530 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
231 Id.
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States, with a documented history of massive, past and contin-
uing, public and private discrimination.  As Professor Kennedy
aptly puts it, “[i]n every aspect of American life, racial differen-
tials in well-being don’t just exist—they erupt, showering the
social landscape with stark familiar patterns.”232  In any event,
the question, for constitutional purposes, is not whether attrib-
uting the current imbalances to discrimination is certainly cor-
rect.  Instead, the relevant question is whether legislatures
should be permitted to make such an attribution.
Perhaps it should nonetheless be suspect for the govern-
ment to respond to this situation by classifying individuals
according to their race and treating them differently as a result.
And perhaps a government agency ought not to be permitted to
use such racial classifications if it cannot draw a direct line
between continuing racial isolation and its own past unconsti-
tutional discrimination.  But the mere intent to promote inte-
gration should not be suspect; to the contrary, that intent is
praiseworthy.
As the quote from Professor Kennedy suggests, the same
point can be made for efforts to close racial gaps.  Given the
salience of race in American society, the persistence of racial
gaps in education, health care, and economic achievement
breeds social division, spurs prejudice, and harms our democ-
racy.233  Although those harms might not justify a government
policy that expressly classifies individuals based on their race,
the mere effort to close such racial gaps should not be constitu-
tionally suspect.
One might object that there is no difference between efforts
to harm a racial group and efforts to close racial gaps.  From
one perspective, these are merely two sides of the same coin.234
In a world of limited resources, efforts to close racial gaps will
mean that some individuals receive less than they would have
before (for example, by the schools they attend getting less
funding, in the case of efforts to close educational gaps)—just
as efforts to integrate schools will mean that some individuals
232 KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 178. R
233 See, e.g., Lawrence D. Bobo, Somewhere Between Jim Crow & Post-Racial-
ism: Reflections on the Racial Divide in America Today, 140 DæDALUS J. AM. ACAD.
ARTS & SCI. 11, 14–15 (2011) (“[B]asic racial boundaries are not quickly and
inevitably collapsing . . . . [T]here remain large and durable patterns of black-
white economic inequality as well, patterns that are not overcome or eliminated
even for the middle class and that still rest to a significant degree on discrimina-
tory social processes.”).
234 Cf. Sullivan, supra note 16, at 1511 (noting that “[b]y definition, the choice R
of a cut-off that makes proportionately more minorities eligible necessarily makes
proportionately fewer whites eligible”).
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do not get to attend the precise school they would have at-
tended before.  But the assertion that efforts to close racial
gaps are the same as efforts to harm members of a racial group
assumes that the world in which racial gaps exist reflects a just
baseline.  Why, however, should a government agency be dis-
entitled to conclude that that world instead reflects an ac-
cumulation of harms and acts of discrimination, “some
influenced by government, some not,”235 that were in fact un-
just?  There is ample evidence to support such a conclusion.236
At least so long as the government does not classify individuals
by race, it ought to be free to respond to those injustices with-
out having to satisfy strict scrutiny.  Certainly, there is nothing
in the pre-Inclusive Communities holdings of the Court that
would stand in the government’s way.  There is, however, an
important reason to worry that the formalist line drawn by the
Court will be subject to efforts at evasion, which will make the
line unstable.  I discuss that concern in the next section.
D. Concerns About the Court’s Analysis
I have argued that Inclusive Communities rests on the pre-
mise that government actions aimed at promoting racial inte-
gration or closing racial gaps do not trigger strict scrutiny
unless they classify individuals based on their race.  And I have
argued that Inclusive Communities’ approach to equal protec-
tion doctrine fits the prior cases.  This is not to say that the
Court’s approach represents the best possible equal protection
doctrine.  In this section, I point out some problems with that
approach.  Nonetheless, I argue that is the best available ap-
proach consistent with prior doctrine.
By placing so much weight on whether a government ac-
tion is categorized as a classification or not, the Inclusive Com-
munities approach has many of the flaws that often accompany
formalistic rules.  For one thing, that approach is over- and
under-inclusive.  Government actions that do not formally
classify individuals based on their race might well raise some of
the same concerns regarding social divisiveness, or even their
effects on individual dignity, as do formal classifications.  This
might be true of government actions that aim at closing racial
gaps,237 as well as of government actions that have no race-
235 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
798 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
236 See supra note 100. R
237 See Bagenstos, supra note 209, at 2854–55. R
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related motivations at all but have manifest racial effects.238
Whether an individual feels demeaned by such an action, and
whether it has divisive effects, is a matter of the expressive
social meaning of the action and not its form239—and this is
even before we get to values beyond avoiding divisiveness and
individual indignity, such as the desire to disestablish a system
of group based subordination, that many believe are an impor-
tant subject of equal protection concern but that the focus on
classification poorly fits.240  Conversely, even some classifica-
tions may not raise any especial concerns about dignity, divi-
siveness, entrenching or subordination.241
We might also worry that the asserted effort to close racial
gaps will sometimes in practice serve as a cover for an effort to
harm members of a particular racial group.242  To spin out an
example drawn from Justice Thomas’s Inclusive Communities
dissent,243 what if a legislature sought to “close racial gaps” in
238 Although Professor Lawrence articulates his “cultural meaning” test—
which would “evaluate governmental conduct to determine whether it conveys a
symbolic message to which the culture attaches racial significance”—as a means
of determining whether a formally race-neutral action is driven by unconscious
bias, Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324 (1987), it should be apparent
that even laws that lack any racial motivation or formal classification can have
such a meaning.
239 See Primus, supra note 51, at 1371–73; Siegel, Antibalkanization, supra R
note 7, at 1360–65; see also Bagenstos, supra note 209, at 2864–65 (arguing that R
it is “plausible that many laws will have a social meaning that does not turn on
such formalities” as whether they “specifically treat[ ] people differently based on
their group status, or require[ ] judges, administrators, or regulated entities ap-
plying the law to consider individuals’ group status”).
240 See generally Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights
Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9–10
(2003) (arguing that the anticlassification and antisubordination principles over-
lap and that their application shifts over time in response to social struggle).
241 Professor Primus notes that some practices that seem to meet even a
narrow definition of express racial classifications—notably “the police use of ra-
cial descriptions of criminal suspects, the Census Bureau’s collection of demo-
graphic data, state legislatures’ race-based redistricting practices, and social
service agencies’ race-conscious adoption placements”—are not invariably sub-
jected to strict scrutiny.  Primus, supra note 16, at 505 (footnotes omitted).  Per- R
haps that is because courts deem these sorts of classifications as not raising the
same concerns as other racial classifications. But cf. Siegel, Antibalkanization,
supra note 7, at 1360–65 (arguing that courts should see police use of racial R
descriptions in apprehending suspects as raising these concerns).
242 It is reasons like this that led even the more liberal bloc in Bakke to
support heightened—but not strict—scrutiny for benign racial classifications.
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (1978) (Brennan,
White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part).  As I discuss in text, we might have similar concerns about facially
neutral laws that purportedly aim at benign racial ends.
243 See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2530 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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the National Basketball Association by, say, requiring all play-
ers to have attended high-socioeconomic-status high schools?
We would be rightly suspicious of the legislature’s motivation,
but the lack of a racial classification would deprive us of a basis
to subject it to heightened scrutiny.
The slippage between the formal anti-classification rule
and the purposes served by that rule puts pressure on courts
to define “classification” elastically. Ricci is an example: Unless
“classification” encompasses formally race-neutral actions that
are taken because of the effects they will have on particular
individuals, identified because of their race, the anti-classifica-
tion rule will be easy to evade.  Yet once we expand the concept
of classification to such formally race-neutral actions, it is hard
to know where to stop without encompassing all racially moti-
vated actions.  The principle that a motivation to achieve inte-
gration does not in itself trigger strict scrutiny, while a
motivation to harm a particular racial group does, provides
some limitation.  But, because of the close analytic and practi-
cal connection between closing racial gaps and harming mem-
bers of particular racial groups, it is fuzzy in practice.  In the
end, courts are likely to determine that government actions are
or are not classifications based on the degree to which the
judges believe that the actions raise normative concerns.244
But because the courts will frame the inquiry around the seem-
ingly formal question of whether a classification exists, the nor-
mative considerations will likely be balanced offstage.245
One way of responding to these problems, of course, would
be to adopt the syllogistic Adarand-plus-Davis reading I have
been arguing against.  One could simply say that government
action triggers strict scrutiny any time it is motivated by the
desire to achieve a racially defined objective.  As I showed in the
previous two sections, though, such a doctrine would contra-
vene widely held intuitions.  It would mean that even the No
Child Left Behind law or Obamacare would trigger strict scru-
tiny—because they are at least in part intended to improve
education and health care for minorities.  Indeed, it would even
244 This is the major point of Professor Rich’s analysis of the Court’s classifica-
tion jurisprudence. See generally Rich, supra note 141, at 1587–92 (explaining R
that the “application of strict scrutiny always reflects a choice by the reviewing
court”); see also Primus, supra note 16, at 514 (arguing that “courts’ decisions R
about whether state action uses racial classifications are often tied to their view of
the acceptability of the underlying state action”).
245 For a recent critique of a similar sort of formalism in another Title VII
context, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Formalism and Employer Liability Under Title
VII, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 145, 146–47 (2014).
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mean that government prohibitions of private-sector inten-
tional discrimination would be suspect.  And because an effort
to overcome societal discrimination cannot satisfy strict scru-
tiny, these laws would likely fail that test, even though they are
formally race-neutral.  Even if a rule that all racially motivated
actions trigger strict scrutiny would be consistent with pre-
Inclusive Communities doctrine, it is not a rule that we should
want the Court to have adopted.
There is another way to respond to these concerns.  That
would be to adopt some version of the equal protection doctrine
advocated by Justices Marshall and Stevens when they were on
the Court.  Under their approach, neither a racial classification
nor a racial motivation would be necessary in every case to
trigger searching scrutiny of a government action with manifest
racial effects.246  And when a racially discriminatory action did
trigger such scrutiny, actions designed to promote inclusion or
overcome past discrimination would forthrightly receive more
lenient review than actions designed to exclude or maintain
racial hierarchy.247  Rather than applying pre-set tiers of scru-
tiny, the intensiveness of the review the court applied would
depend on open consideration and weighing of the relevant
equal protection interests in the particular setting.248  Cru-
cially, those interests would include counteracting subordina-
tion as well as avoiding divisiveness and preventing individual
indignity.249  Under such an approach, laws like Title VII or No
Child Left Behind could receive some degree of scrutiny—to
ensure that they, unlike my hypothetical law seeking to “inte-
grate” the NBA, were not exclusionary policies in disguise—
without being forced to satisfy the ordinary strict scrutiny
standards that they would likely fail.
There is much to be said for the Marshall/Stevens ap-
proach to equal protection.250  But it is not an approach that is
246 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 254 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory im-
pact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the
Court’s opinion might assume.”).
247 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243–49 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 356–62
(1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
248 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451–55
(1985) (Stevens, J., concurring); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 98–110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
249 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250 See James E. Fleming, “There is Only One Equal Protection Clause”: An
Appreciation of Justice Stevens’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2301 (2006).  For what I regard as an effort to elaborate on and perfect the
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consistent with the case law as it existed as of Inclusive Com-
munities.  To the contrary, the Court had squarely rejected that
approach in Davis, Adarand, and Gratz, among other cases.
For all its problems, the equal protection approach that under-
lies Inclusive Communities likely represents the most norma-
tively defensible reading of the then-existing precedent.  It is in
any event far preferable to the most realistic alternative, which
would have subjected all laws with a racially defined object to
strict scrutiny.
CONCLUSION: LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE
My argument in this Article has been largely backward-
focused.  I have attempted to tease out just what the Court held
in Inclusive Communities and show that it fits with a fair read-
ing of prior cases.  But I have also suggested that the approach
to equal protection that underlies Inclusive Communities is not
optimal, and that it is unstable.  By formalistically relying on
the existence of a classification as the trigger for strict scrutiny,
the Court’s approach puts great pressure on the definition of
“classification.”  The Court is likely to respond to that pressure
by interpreting the concept elastically, by balancing the equal
protection interests it finds salient, but doing so offstage.  It is
therefore worth offering some thoughts about the future course
of doctrine in this area, even if those thoughts are necessarily
speculative.
It is tempting to think that the instability in the doctrine
will be resolved by a new appointment to the Court.  Before
Justice Scalia’s unexpected death, Professor Siegel at least al-
lowed herself to “imagine” that a liberal appointment would
productively move the Court towards a more progressive juris-
prudence in this area.251  Should Justice Scalia be replaced by
a justice whose views on these issues lie to the left of Justice
Kennedy’s—which will happen only if the Senate confirms an
appointee of President Obama or a Democratic successor—it is
possible that Professor Siegel’s imaginings will come to pass.
Marshall/Stevens approach, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77
S. CALIF. L. REV. 481 (2004); see also Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Once and Future Equal Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059 (2011) (propos-
ing a more progressive race jurisprudence); Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 7, R
at 93–94 (imagining a more progressive approach to race jurisprudence than that
adopted by the current Court).
251 Professor Siegel at least allows herself to “imagine” that a liberal appoint-
ment will productively move the Court towards a more progressive jurisprudence.
Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 7, at 93–94. R
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But a new appointment seems to me unlikely to resolve the
instability of the doctrine.  An appointment that gives a major-
ity to the race-liberal bloc might well lead the Court to relax the
standard of scrutiny for classifications that seek to integrate.  If
that happens, less will turn on the formalistic determination
whether a government action constitutes a racial classification.
But no member of the current liberal bloc has squarely en-
dorsed an approach that would eschew formalistic lines like
classification or tiers of scrutiny.  The last justice to endorse
such an approach was Justice Stevens.252  It is possible that a
new appointment will lead the four more liberal justices to
rethink their jurisprudence more extensively.  More likely,
though, if the race liberals get a majority we are likely to con-
tinue to see an unstable and formalistic doctrine—albeit one
whose problems will be muted.
If Justice Scalia is replaced by a Republican appointee, and
a Republican president goes on to replace Justice Kennedy or
one of the race liberals, the Court will quite likely hold, not-
withstanding Inclusive Communities, that disparate impact
laws are unconstitutional.253  In so ruling, the Court might say
that all government actions with a racial motive trigger strict
scrutiny.  But the Court is still unlikely to follow the Adarand-
plus-Davis syllogism to its logical conclusion, for doing so
would imperil many laws that have wide support from conserv-
atives and liberals alike.254  The obvious way the Court might
find to manage the dilemma is by ratcheting up the require-
ment for proving intent.  One way of reading the racial redis-
tricting cases is that they were driven by just such a
dynamic.255  In Shaw v. Reno,256 the Court held that strict
scrutiny is required for facially neutral redistricting plans that,
without diluting anyone’s vote, have lines that cannot be ex-
plained on grounds other than race.  But because race is, in
American society, so closely connected with partisan affiliation
252 See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451–55 (Stevens, J., concurring); Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. at 98–110 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
253 To avoid expressly overruling Inclusive Communities, the Court could offer
the fig leaf that Inclusive Communities did not explicitly hold that disparate impact
laws are constitutional.  But that is a mere fig leaf, as I discussed in supra Part
I.B.: The Court’s opinion necessarily rests on the premise that disparate impact
laws are, in fact, constitutional, and the Court explicitly adverted to the question
in determining what aspects of disparate impact law do—and do not—raise seri-
ous constitutional issues.
254 See supra Part II.A.
255 For discussion of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes
198–201. R
256 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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and other shared interests—perfectly appropriate considera-
tions in redistricting, and central concerns of political actors—
the Court soon realized that it could not subject districting
plans to strict scrutiny whenever race played a role in their
crafting.257  Responding to this problem, the Court erected a
special heightened burden for proving discriminatory intent in
non-dilutive racial gerrymandering cases.  Instead of suc-
ceeding by proving that race was a “motivating factor”—the
usual equal protection standard—plaintiffs in these cases
must prove that race was the “predominant” motive, and that
other factors were “subordinated” to race in redistricting.  Ap-
plying that heightened standard, the Court has refused to ap-
ply strict scrutiny in cases in which race and political affiliation
were coordinate considerations for those drawing district lines.
This mode of analysis has recently bled back into lower-court
cases involving states’ limitations of opportunities to register to
vote and cast ballots—cases to which the “predominant motive”
standard does not, in terms, apply.258  In those cases, courts
have held that a partisan motivation for limiting these opportu-
nities shields the government’s action from strict scrutiny, de-
spite the strong overlap between racial and partisan
identification.  It is likely that any broader-scale ratcheting up
of the discriminatory intent requirement will similarly redound
to the detriment of minorities.259
Another means a race-conservative majority might employ
to limit the disruptive effects of the Adarand-plus-Davis syllo-
gism is to introduce flexibility into the strict scrutiny analysis.
Instead of requiring the same degree of compelling interest for
every government action motivated by race, the Court could
permit a lesser interest—such as countering societal discrimi-
nation—to justify measures that do not classify individuals
based on their race.  Such an approach would move strict scru-
tiny toward a straightforward proportionality analysis.260  But
a doctrine that subjected every one of the vast number of ra-
cially motivated but non-classifying policies to judicial supervi-
257 See Karlan, supra note 198, at 1577. R
258 See generally Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party? How Courts Should Think
About Republican Efforts to Make it Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Else-
where, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58, 70–73 (2014) (discussing standards that courts
apply in cases involving voter identification laws).
259 In other words, it will further entrench the pattern of “divided equal protec-
tion” that Professor Siegel discusses in Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 7, in R
which the equal protection claims of members of majority groups receive more
solicitude than those of members of minority groups.
260 On the Court’s vacillation between smoking-out and proportionality read-
ings of strict scrutiny, see supra note 164. R
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sion via proportionality review would likely strike a
conservative majority as too reminiscent of Lochner.261
Should neither the race-liberals nor the race-conservatives
achieve a majority, and should Justice Kennedy retain his posi-
tion as the median justice—as will happen if a Republican
president replaces Justice Scalia and no further vacancies on
the Court occur soon—it is entirely possible that the Court will
evolve away from a formalist, classification-dependent equal
protection doctrine.  Justice Kennedy has been the justice who
has seemed least in the thrall of formalist tiers-of-scrutiny
analysis in Fourteenth Amendment cases.  As many have
noted, and some have decried, he avoided invoking that form of
analysis in any of his key gay rights cases over the past twenty
years262—a pattern that continued in Obergefell v. Hodges this
past Term.  Justice Kennedy might well come to conclude that
the antibalkanization concerns that have led him to focus on
classification as a trigger for strict scrutiny,263 are present in
some cases that do not involve classifications as well.  He might
determine that legal doctrine should focus directly on the in-
dignity and divisiveness caused by a particular practice rather
than on an imperfect mediating proxy such as the existence or
nonexistence of a classification.  And he might just persuade
four other justices to go along with him.  As today’s most prom-
inent and divisive racial issues—those involving criminal jus-
tice and immigration—inevitably make their way to the Court,
the justices will have ample opportunity to consider these
matters.
Or the Court might just muddle through.  Unstable doc-
trines can last for a long time.  And the instability of the equal
protection doctrine applied in Inclusive Communities likely fits
well with the median American voter’s ambivalent views of ra-
cial issues.  If the application of the Court’s classification-fo-
cused framework is unstable, that fits the instability of the
fitful American political response to the past and continuing
effects of slavery, segregation, and racial discrimination.  We
might, therefore, be applying the Inclusive Communities ap-
proach for a long time.
261 Note the emphasis Chief Justice Roberts placed on the Lochner analogy in
his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
262 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
263 See Siegel, Antibalkanization, supra note 7. R
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